

Appendix Table 1: Do Elite Capture Targeted Programs? (4 votes for Elite Status rather than two)

	<u>Beneficiaries</u>				<u>Targeting Lists</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: Government Transfer Programs</i>							
	<u>Receives Benefits</u>				<u>Targeting Lists</u>		
	BLT 05	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin	PPLS 1	PPLS 2	PPLS 3
Elite	0.001 (0.018)	0.000 (0.018)	0.045** (0.019)	-0.013 (0.015)	0.014 (0.017)	-0.026* (0.015)	-0.026** (0.010)
Log Consumption	-0.194*** (0.014)	-0.200*** (0.014)	-0.187*** (0.014)	-0.203*** (0.014)	-0.205*** (0.014)	-0.173*** (0.013)	-0.080*** (0.010)
Observations	3,985	3,985	3,996	3,996	3,996	3,996	3,996
Dependent Variable Mean	0.362	0.387	0.425	0.751	0.359	0.262	0.102
<i>Panel B: PKH Experiment</i>							
	<u>Receives PKH</u>				<u>Targeting List PKH</u>		
	PMT	Community	Community		PPLS	Community	Community
Elite	-0.042*** (0.014)	-0.044*** (0.016)	-0.028 (0.022)		-0.017* (0.009)	-0.029** (0.012)	-0.027* (0.017)
Log Consumption	-0.095*** (0.015)	-0.124*** (0.015)	-0.124*** (0.015)		-0.035*** (0.009)	-0.074*** (0.012)	-0.074*** (0.012)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.006 (0.024)				-0.012 (0.019)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.032 (0.030)				-0.002 (0.024)
Observations	1,863	1,936	1,936		1,996	2,000	2,000
Dependent Variable Mean	0.110	0.142	0.142		0.0431	0.0770	0.0770
<i>Panel C: Low-stakes experiment</i>							
					<u>Targeting List</u>		
					PMT	Community	Community
Elite					0.011 (0.026)	-0.069** (0.029)	-0.114*** (0.042)
Log Consumption					-0.197*** (0.016)	-0.209*** (0.016)	-0.209*** (0.016)
Elite Subtreatment							-0.011 (0.026)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment							0.082 (0.057)
Observations					1,814	1,881	1,881
Dependent Variable Mean					0.294	0.313	0.313

Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression of benefit receipt or benefit targeting on elite status and log per capita consumption. Stratum fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 2: Do Elite Capture Targeted Programs? Without Controls for Consumption

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: Government Transfer Programs</i>							
	Receives Benefits				Targeting Lists		
	BLT 05	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin	PPLS 1	PPLS 2	PPLS 3
Elite	-0.022	-0.020	0.005	-0.032**	-0.023	-0.050***	-0.028***
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Observations	3,987	3,987	3,998	3,998	3,998	3,998	3,998
Dependent Variable Mean	0.362	0.387	0.425	0.750	0.359	0.261	0.102
<i>Panel B: PKH Experiment</i>							
	Receives PKH			Targeting List PKH			
	PMT	Community	Community	PPLS	Community	Community	
Elite	-0.045***	-0.060***	-0.049**	-0.021**	-0.040***	-0.041**	
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.017)	
Elite Subtreatment			-0.006			-0.013	
			(0.025)			(0.019)	
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.022			0.003	
			(0.030)			(0.023)	
Observations	1,865	1,936	1,936	1,998	2,000	2,000	
Dependent Variable Mean	0.109	0.142	0.142	0.0430	0.0770	0.0770	
<i>Panel C: Low-stakes experiment</i>							
	Targeting List						
	PMT	Community	Community				
Elite	-0.026	-0.005	-0.056				
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.038)				
Elite Subtreatment			-0.033				
			(0.026)				
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			0.105**				
			(0.050)				
Observations	1,816	1,882	1,882				
Dependent Variable Mean	0.294	0.312	0.312				

Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression of benefit receipt or benefit targeting on elite status. Stratum fixed effects are included in all regressions Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 3: Do Elites Capture Targeted Programs? (Social Connection with Elites)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: Government Transfer Programs</i>							
	Receives Benefits				Targeting Lists		
	BLT 05	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin	PPLS 1	PPLS 2	PPLS 3
Social/community groups with RT Head	-0.016 (0.016)	-0.017 (0.015)	-0.021 (0.016)	-0.026* (0.016)	0.008 (0.015)	0.005 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.009)
Observations	3,588	3,588	3,596	3,596	3,596	3,596	3,596
Dependent Variable Mean	0.358	0.387	0.417	0.753	0.359	0.266	0.105
<i>Panel B: PKH Experiment</i>							
	Receives PKH				Targeting List PKH		
	PMT	Community			PMT	Community	
Social/community groups with RT Head	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.003 (0.017)			-0.001 (0.005)	0.014 (0.016)	
Observations	1,670	1,739			1,796	1,800	
Dependent Variable Mean	0.114	0.151			0.0451	0.0817	

Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression of benefit receipt or benefit targeting on elite status, log consumption per capita, and number of social/community groups household is a member of with the RT head (shown), controlling for total number of social/community groups household participates in and total number of groups RT head participates in. Stratum fixed effects are included in all regressions Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 4: Do Elite Capture Targeted Programs? With Control Variables

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: Government Transfer Programs</i>							
	Receives Benefits				Targeting Lists		
	BLT 05	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin	PPLS 1	PPLS 2	PPLS 3
Elite	-0.003	0.012	0.014	-0.007	0.006	-0.020	-0.018*
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Log Consumption	-0.117***	-0.126***	-0.136***	-0.160***	-0.137***	-0.111***	-0.041***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.010)
Observations	3,981	3,981	3,992	3,992	3,992	3,992	3,992
Dependent Variable Mean	0.362	0.388	0.425	0.751	0.359	0.262	0.102
<i>Panel B: PKH Experiment</i>							
	Receives PKH			Targeting List PKH			
	PMT	Community	Community	PMT	Community	Community	
Elite	-0.004	-0.039**	-0.029	-0.004	-0.021	-0.020	
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.017)	
Log Consumption	-0.046***	-0.077***	-0.077***	-0.005	-0.051***	-0.050***	
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.013)	
Elite Subtreatment			-0.007			-0.012	
			(0.022)			(0.018)	
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.021			-0.000	
			(0.027)			(0.022)	
Observations	1,860	1,935	1,935	1,993	1,999	1,999	
Dependent Variable Mean	0.110	0.142	0.142	0.0432	0.0770	0.0770	
<i>Panel C: Low-stakes experiment</i>							
	Targeting List						
	PMT	Community	Community				
Elite	-0.032	-0.006	-0.031				
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.036)				
Log Consumption	-0.123***	-0.229***	-0.230***				
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)				
Elite Subtreatment			-0.005				
			(0.025)				
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			0.054				
			(0.046)				
Observations	1,814	1,876	1,876				
Dependent Variable Mean	0.294	0.312	0.312				

Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression of benefit receipt or benefit targeting on elite status, log per capita consumption, and other controls, including household makeup, community connectedness, religious practices, savings, and economic shocks. Stratum fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 5: Do Elites Capture Targeted Programs? Robustness to Village Restrictions

	Receives PKH		
	PMT (1)	Community (2)	Community (3)
<i>Panel A: Drop all in kecamatans with ≥ 1 village dropped</i>			
Elite	-0.027* (0.015)	-0.040** (0.016)	-0.034 (0.022)
Log Consumption	-0.108*** (0.016)	-0.121*** (0.015)	-0.121*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.017 (0.025)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.012 (0.031)
Observations	1,714	1,752	1,752
Dependent Variable Mean	0.113	0.142	0.142
<i>Panel B: Drop all in kecamatans with $\geq 10\%$ of villages dropped</i>			
Elite	-0.027* (0.015)	-0.042*** (0.016)	-0.031 (0.022)
Log Consumption	-0.108*** (0.016)	-0.120*** (0.015)	-0.121*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.010 (0.025)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.023 (0.031)
Observations	1,744	1,790	1,790
Dependent Variable Mean	0.111	0.142	0.142
<i>Panel C: Drop all villages dropped in new study</i>			
Elite	-0.032** (0.015)	-0.041*** (0.015)	-0.026 (0.021)
Log Consumption	-0.097*** (0.015)	-0.125*** (0.015)	-0.126*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.001 (0.025)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.029 (0.029)
Observations	1,834	1,869	1,869
Dependent Variable Mean	0.111	0.141	0.141
<i>Panel D: Drop all in kecamatans with $\geq 50\%$ villages dropped, and those in new study</i>			
Elite	-0.032** (0.015)	-0.041*** (0.015)	-0.025 (0.021)
Log Consumption	-0.097*** (0.015)	-0.125*** (0.015)	-0.125*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			0.002 (0.025)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.032 (0.029)
Observations	1,834	1,849	1,849
Dependent Variable Mean	0.111	0.142	0.142

Notes: This table test for the robustness of the results on who became a beneficiary of PKH. All regressions include stratum fixed effects and have standard errors clustered at the village level. An F-test on the difference between the elite related coefficient in Panel A, Columns (1) and (2) yields: $F(1, 359) = 0.38$ Prob > F = .5384. The same test in Panel B yields: $F(1, 366) = 0.46$ Prob > F = .4984. Panel C — $F(1, 383) = 0.17$ Prob > F = .6773. Panel D — $F(1, 381) = 0.17$ Prob > F = .6802. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 6: Do Elite Capture Targeted Programs? (Household itself is elite; not including relatives)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: Government Transfer Programs Formal Elites</i>							
	Receives Benefits				Targeting Lists		
	BLT 05	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin	PPLS 1	PPLS 2	PPLS 3
Elite	0.065*** (0.022)	0.040* (0.021)	0.111*** (0.022)	0.000 (0.019)	0.045** (0.022)	-0.006 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.013)
Observations	3,985	3,985	3,996	3,996	3,996	3,996	3,996
Dependent Variable Mean	0.362	0.387	0.425	0.751	0.359	0.262	0.102
<i>Panel B: Government Transfer Programs Informal Elites</i>							
	Receives Benefits				Targeting Lists		
	BLT 05	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin	PPLS 1	PPLS 2	PPLS 3
Elite	-0.138*** (0.024)	-0.118*** (0.025)	-0.086*** (0.028)	-0.151*** (0.026)	-0.045 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.024)	-0.009 (0.017)
Observations	3,985	3,985	3,996	3,996	3,996	3,996	3,996
Dependent Variable Mean	0.362	0.387	0.425	0.751	0.359	0.262	0.102
<i>Panel C: PKH Experiment Formal Elites</i>							
	Receives PKH			Targeting List PKH			
	PMT	Community	Community	PMT	Community	Community	
Elite	-0.019 (0.017)	-0.054*** (0.018)	-0.060** (0.024)	-0.010 (0.010)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.025)	
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			0.012 (0.035)			-0.012 (0.031)	
Observations	1,863	1,936	1,936	1,996	2,000	2,000	
Dependent Variable Mean	0.110	0.142	0.142	0.0431	0.0770	0.0770	
<i>Panel D: PKH Experiment Informal Elites</i>							
	Receives PKH			Targeting List PKH			
	PMT	Community	Community	PMT	Community	Community	
Elite	-0.046** (0.023)	-0.010 (0.028)	-0.021 (0.041)	-0.003 (0.016)	-0.032* (0.018)	-0.043** (0.018)	
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			0.023 (0.056)			0.021 (0.034)	
Observations	1,863	1,936	1,936	1,996	2,000	2,000	
Dependent Variable Mean	0.110	0.142	0.142	0.0431	0.0770	0.0770	

Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression of benefit receipt or benefit targeting on elite status (leader status) and log per capita consumption (not shown). Stratum fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 7: Formal Versus Informal Elites (Including Control Variables)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: Government Transfer Programs — Formal Elites</i>							
	Receives Benefits				Targeting Lists		
	BLT 05	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin	PPLS 1	PPLS 2	PPLS 3
Elite	0.043**	0.052***	0.069***	0.025*	0.023	-0.004	-0.006
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Observations	3,981	3,981	3,992	3,992	3,992	3,992	3,992
Dependent Variable Mean	0.362	0.388	0.425	0.751	0.359	0.262	0.102
<i>Panel B: Government Transfer Programs — Informal Elites</i>							
	Receives Benefits				Targeting Lists		
	BLT 05	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin	PPLS 1	PPLS 2	PPLS 3
Elite	-0.061***	-0.051**	-0.070***	-0.047***	-0.001	-0.011	-0.013
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.012)
Observations	3,981	3,981	3,992	3,992	3,992	3,992	3,992
Dependent Variable Mean	0.362	0.388	0.425	0.751	0.359	0.262	0.102
<i>Panel C: PKH Experiment — Formal Elites</i>							
	Receives PKH			Targeting List PKH			
	PMT	Community	Community	PMT	Community	Community	
Elite	-0.008	-0.033*	-0.017	-0.006	-0.006	-0.006	
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.023)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.019)	
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.034			-0.001	
			(0.030)			(0.024)	
Observations	1,860	1,935	1,935	1,993	1,999	1,999	
Dependent Variable Mean	0.110	0.142	0.142	0.0432	0.0770	0.0770	
<i>Panel D: PKH Experiment — Informal Elites</i>							
	Receives PKH			Targeting List PKH			
	PMT	Community	Community	PMT	Community	Community	
Elite	-0.007	-0.015	-0.016	0.005	-0.032**	-0.044**	
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.022)	
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			0.001			0.024	
			(0.037)			(0.030)	
Observations	1,860	1,935	1,935	1,993	1,999	1,999	
Dependent Variable Mean	0.110	0.142	0.142	0.0432	0.0770	0.0770	

Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression of benefit receipt or benefit targeting on elite status, log per capita consumption, and other controls, including household makeup, community connectedness, religious practices, savings, and economic shocks. Stratum fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 8: Formal Versus Informal Elites in Low-stakes experiment

	Formal Elites			Informal Elites		
	PMT (1)	Community (2)	Community (3)	PMT (4)	Community (5)	Community (6)
Elite	-0.054** (0.022)	-0.075*** (0.026)	-0.105*** (0.037)	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.103*** (0.026)	-0.100*** (0.026)
Log Consumption	-0.194*** (0.016)	-0.207*** (0.016)	-0.207*** (0.016)	-0.196*** (0.016)	-0.205*** (0.016)	-0.204*** (0.016)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.011 (0.026)			0.008 (0.024)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			0.059 (0.050)			-0.033 (0.035)
Observations	1,814	1,881	1,881	1,814	1,881	1,881
Dependent Variable Mean	0.294	0.313	0.313	0.294	0.313	0.313

Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression of benefit receipt or benefit targeting on elite status and log per capita consumption. Stratum fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 9A: Do Formal Elites Capture Targeted Programs? Robustness to Village Restrictions

	Receives PKH		
	PMT	Community	Community
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A: Drop all in kecamatans with >=1 village dropped</i>			
Elite	-0.031** (0.015)	-0.045*** (0.016)	-0.034 (0.024)
Log Consumption	-0.108*** (0.016)	-0.121*** (0.015)	-0.122*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.015 (0.023)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.023 (0.031)
Observations	1,714	1,752	1,752
Dependent Variable Mean	0.113	0.142	0.142
<i>Panel B: Drop all in kecamatans with >=10% of villages dropped</i>			
Elite	-0.031** (0.015)	-0.045*** (0.016)	-0.028 (0.024)
Log Consumption	-0.108*** (0.016)	-0.121*** (0.015)	-0.122*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.010 (0.024)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.034 (0.032)
Observations	1,744	1,790	1,790
Dependent Variable Mean	0.111	0.142	0.142
<i>Panel C: Drop all villages dropped in new study</i>			
Elite	-0.035** (0.015)	-0.043*** (0.015)	-0.020 (0.023)
Log Consumption	-0.097*** (0.015)	-0.126*** (0.015)	-0.127*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			0.001 (0.023)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.046 (0.031)
Observations	1,834	1,869	1,869
Dependent Variable Mean	0.111	0.141	0.141
<i>Panel D: Drop all in kecamatans with >=50% villages dropped, and those in new study</i>			
Elite	-0.035** (0.015)	-0.043*** (0.015)	-0.019 (0.023)
Log Consumption	-0.097*** (0.015)	-0.126*** (0.015)	-0.127*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			0.003 (0.024)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.049 (0.031)
Observations	1,834	1,849	1,849
Dependent Variable Mean	0.111	0.142	0.142

Notes: See Appendix Table 8 for table description. An F-test on the difference between the elite related coefficient in Panel A, Columns (1) and (2) yields: $F(1, 359) = 0.40$ Prob > F = .5298. The same test in Panel B yields: $F(1, 366) = 0.37$ Prob > F = .5453. Panel C — $F(1, 383) = 0.17$ Prob > F = .6841. Panel D — $F(1, 381) = 0.17$ Prob > F = .6818. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 9B: Do Informal Elites Capture Targeted Programs? Robustness to Village Restrictions

	Receives PKH		
	PMT (1)	Community (2)	Community (3)
<i>Panel A: Drop all in kecamatans with >=1 village dropped</i>			
Elite	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.014 (0.028)
Log Consumption	-0.109*** (0.016)	-0.125*** (0.015)	-0.125*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.021 (0.025)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			0.003 (0.040)
Observations	1,714	1,752	1,752
Dependent Variable Mean	0.113	0.142	0.142
<i>Panel B: Drop all in kecamatans with >=10% of villages dropped</i>			
Elite	-0.026 (0.018)	-0.017 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.027)
Log Consumption	-0.108*** (0.016)	-0.124*** (0.015)	-0.124*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.018 (0.025)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.002 (0.040)
Observations	1,744	1,790	1,790
Dependent Variable Mean	0.111	0.142	0.142
<i>Panel C: Drop all villages dropped in new study</i>			
Elite	-0.033* (0.018)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.013 (0.027)
Log Consumption	-0.098*** (0.015)	-0.129*** (0.015)	-0.129*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.010 (0.025)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.007 (0.039)
Observations	1,834	1,869	1,869
Dependent Variable Mean	0.111	0.141	0.141
<i>Panel D: Drop all in kecamatans with >=50% villages dropped, and those in new study</i>			
Elite	-0.033* (0.018)	-0.015 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.027)
Log Consumption	-0.098*** (0.015)	-0.129*** (0.015)	-0.129*** (0.015)
Elite Subtreatment			-0.008 (0.025)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment			-0.008 (0.040)
Observations	1,834	1,849	1,849
Dependent Variable Mean	0.111	0.142	0.142

Notes: See Appendix Table 8 for table description. An F-test on the difference between the elite related coefficient in Panel A, Columns (1) and (2) yields: $F(1, 359) = 0.22$ Prob > F = .6406. The same test in Panel B yields: $F(1, 366) = 0.12$ Prob > F = .7272. Panel C — $F(1, 383) = 0.45$ Prob > F = .5022. Panel D — $F(1, 381) = 0.48$ Prob > F = .4896. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 10: Under/Over Quotas and Elite Capture (Formal vs. Informal Elites)

	<u>Beneficiaries</u>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: High Cut-Off — Formal Elites</i>				
	BLT 05	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin
Elite	0.027 (0.020)	0.034* (0.020)	0.064*** (0.020)	0.027 (0.017)
Log consumption	-0.199*** (0.014)	-0.204*** (0.014)	-0.190*** (0.014)	-0.207*** (0.014)
Program slots > 150% of quota	-0.010 (0.026)	0.030 (0.025)	0.035 (0.028)	-0.008 (0.028)
Elite * slots > 150% of quota	0.090** (0.045)	0.050 (0.044)	0.069 (0.043)	0.018 (0.030)
Observations	3,982	3,982	3,993	3,993
Dependent Variable Mean	0.361	0.387	0.425	0.750
<i>Panel B: Over/Under Cut-Off — Formal Elites</i>				
	BLT 05	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin
Elite	0.017 (0.025)	0.038 (0.024)	0.068*** (0.025)	0.024 (0.021)
Log consumption	-0.200*** (0.014)	-0.205*** (0.014)	-0.190*** (0.014)	-0.208*** (0.014)
Program slots over quota	0.041* (0.022)	0.044* (0.022)	0.030 (0.024)	0.013 (0.026)
Elite * slots over quota	0.059 (0.036)	0.017 (0.035)	0.028 (0.036)	0.014 (0.027)
Observations	3,982	3,982	3,993	3,993
Dependent Variable Mean	0.361	0.387	0.425	0.750
<i>Panel C: High Cut-Off — Informal Elites</i>				
Elite	-0.067*** (0.022)	-0.065*** (0.023)	-0.052** (0.025)	-0.059*** (0.020)
Log consumption	-0.190*** (0.014)	-0.196*** (0.014)	-0.179*** (0.014)	-0.201*** (0.014)
Program slots > 150% of quota	0.016 (0.025)	0.044* (0.026)	0.064** (0.027)	-0.001 (0.027)
Elite * slots > 150% of quota	-0.008 (0.054)	0.000 (0.054)	-0.058 (0.055)	-0.008 (0.045)
Observations	3,982	3,982	3,993	3,993
Dependent Variable Mean	0.361	0.387	0.425	0.750
<i>Panel D: Over/Under Cut-Off — Informal Elites</i>				
Elite	-0.095*** (0.025)	-0.089*** (0.027)	-0.079** (0.032)	-0.068** (0.027)
Log consumption	-0.190*** (0.014)	-0.196*** (0.014)	-0.178*** (0.014)	-0.201*** (0.014)
Program slots over quota	0.049** (0.022)	0.041* (0.023)	0.032 (0.024)	0.015 (0.025)
Elite * slots over quota	0.046 (0.038)	0.040 (0.040)	0.025 (0.043)	0.013 (0.036)
Observations	3,982	3,982	3,993	3,993
Dependent Variable Mean	0.361	0.387	0.425	0.750

Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression of benefit receipt on elite status, log per capita consumption, a dummy for the level of program slots in the village relative to quota, and an interaction term. We compute the over-quota variable by comparing BLT 08 village allocation quota with the actual quota that should be given in that village. The allocation quota data for each village comes from PPLS 08 data which give us about 30 percent of household population or 18.5 million households. To generate the actual quota for each village, we first calculate the share of village quota to total district quota from poverty maps exercise using census 2010 data, and then scale that with the district quota predicted by SUSENAS to have equivalent poverty lines. Those who have more slots relative to actual poverty line are considered over-quota. In Panels A and C, the cut-off is set at 150%; in Panels B and D, at 100%. Stratum fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.

Appendix Table 11: Do Elections Constrain Elites? (Formal Elites; Dropping RT Heads)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
<i>Panel A: Government Transfer Programs</i>							
	Receives Benefits				Targeting Lists		
	BLT 05	BLT 08	Jamkesmas	Raskin	PPLS 1	PPLS 2	PPLS 3
Elite x Elected	-0.019	-0.050	0.148**	0.068	0.048	0.043	0.039
	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.050)	(0.036)
Observations	3,552	3,552	3,560	3,560	3,560	3,560	3,560
Dependent Variable Mean	0.356	0.385	0.417	0.751	0.359	0.266	0.104
<i>Panel B: PKH Experiment</i>							
	Receives PKH				Targeting List PKH		
	PMT	Community	Community		PMT	Community	Community
Elite x Elected	0.011	0.050	-0.050		0.082*	0.003	-0.031
	(0.055)	(0.072)	(0.095)		(0.044)	(0.064)	(0.054)
Elite x Elite Subtreatment x Elected			0.182				0.074
			(0.115)				(0.101)
Observations	1,661	1,713	1,713		1,787	1,773	1,773
Dependent Variable Mean	0.115	0.148	0.148		0.0453	0.0812	0.0812

Notes: Each column shows an OLS regression of benefit receipt or benefit targeting on elite status, elected status, log per capita consumption, urban status, and interaction terms. Stratum fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 12A: Probit Model of Benefit Receipt (All Elites)

VARIABLES	(1) PKH	(2) BLT 05	(3) BLT 08	(4) Jamkesmas	(5) Raskin
Elite	-0.128 (0.088)	-0.003 (0.050)	0.050 (0.050)	0.045 (0.049)	0.038 (0.055)
Log per capita consumption	-0.071 (0.093)	-0.228*** (0.055)	-0.238*** (0.054)	-0.346*** (0.053)	-0.391*** (0.058)
PMT score	-1.295*** (0.146)	-0.560*** (0.082)	-0.608*** (0.081)	-0.304*** (0.077)	-0.701*** (0.087)
Log household size	0.071 (0.132)	-0.010 (0.077)	-0.005 (0.076)	0.059 (0.074)	-0.395*** (0.084)
Share of children in household	0.793*** (0.234)	0.612*** (0.138)	0.390*** (0.136)	0.208 (0.132)	0.250* (0.150)
Connected with other households	-0.018 (0.019)	0.010 (0.010)	0.008 (0.010)	0.033*** (0.010)	0.035*** (0.011)
Having family members outside the village	0.013 (0.028)	0.012 (0.018)	0.013 (0.018)	-0.032* (0.018)	-0.013 (0.020)
Participating in religious groups	-0.249*** (0.073)	0.119*** (0.045)	0.099** (0.045)	-0.058 (0.043)	0.125** (0.049)
Participating in community projects	0.068 (0.084)	-0.013 (0.052)	-0.073 (0.051)	-0.051 (0.050)	-0.109* (0.058)
Contributing money to village projects	-0.131 (0.086)	-0.027 (0.049)	-0.011 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.047)	-0.149*** (0.052)
Working hard	-0.072*** (0.024)	-0.074*** (0.014)	-0.059*** (0.014)	-0.061*** (0.014)	-0.009 (0.015)
Friendliness	0.011 (0.027)	0.070*** (0.015)	0.040*** (0.015)	0.062*** (0.015)	0.042** (0.017)
Total savings amount	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Share of savings in bank	-0.091 (0.166)	-0.533*** (0.086)	-0.523*** (0.084)	-0.231*** (0.075)	-0.448*** (0.074)
Share of debt	-0.043** (0.019)	-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.006)
Being ethnic minority	0.091 (0.085)	0.170*** (0.052)	0.096* (0.051)	0.263*** (0.050)	0.175*** (0.057)
Being religious minority	0.276 (0.244)	-0.200 (0.166)	-0.405** (0.172)	-0.364** (0.159)	-0.454*** (0.154)
Household head has elementary education or less	0.138 (0.092)	0.238*** (0.051)	0.248*** (0.050)	0.169*** (0.049)	0.262*** (0.055)
Household head is widow	0.351** (0.146)	-0.102 (0.106)	-0.013 (0.105)	-0.062 (0.104)	0.062 (0.120)
Household head is disabled	0.241* (0.123)	0.209** (0.089)	0.091 (0.089)	0.085 (0.087)	0.104 (0.104)
Household experienced death of family member	0.103 (0.227)	-0.012 (0.151)	0.091 (0.149)	0.212 (0.150)	0.323* (0.193)
Household has sick family member	0.042 (0.097)	0.127** (0.060)	0.104* (0.060)	0.016 (0.059)	-0.042 (0.067)
Household experienced income shock	-0.085 (0.074)	0.019 (0.045)	-0.045 (0.044)	-0.072* (0.043)	-0.019 (0.050)
Tobacco and/or alcohol consumption	0.502*** (0.155)	0.191* (0.106)	0.165 (0.105)	0.304*** (0.100)	0.484*** (0.129)
Constant	15.664*** (1.996)	9.351*** (1.093)	10.386*** (1.080)	7.935*** (1.026)	14.992*** (1.139)
Observations	3,992	3,981	3,981	3,992	3,992
Dependent Variable Mean	0.0601	0.362	0.388	0.425	0.751

Notes: Probit model from social welfare calculation. Each column shows a probit regression of benefit receipt on elite status, log per capita consumption, and other controls. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 12B: Probit Model of Benefit Receipt (Formal Elites)

VARIABLES	(1) PKH	(2) BLT 05	(3) BLT 08	(4) Jamkesmas	(5) Raskin
Elite	-0.113 (0.097)	0.133** (0.054)	0.165*** (0.054)	0.227*** (0.052)	0.119** (0.060)
Log per capita consumption	-0.073 (0.093)	-0.232*** (0.055)	-0.241*** (0.054)	-0.353*** (0.053)	-0.392*** (0.058)
PMT score	-1.296*** (0.146)	-0.560*** (0.082)	-0.608*** (0.081)	-0.303*** (0.078)	-0.700*** (0.087)
Log household size	0.066 (0.132)	-0.010 (0.077)	-0.002 (0.076)	0.062 (0.074)	-0.392*** (0.084)
Share of children in household	0.795*** (0.234)	0.633*** (0.139)	0.409*** (0.137)	0.233* (0.133)	0.264* (0.150)
Connected with other households	-0.020 (0.019)	0.004 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)	0.025** (0.010)	0.032*** (0.011)
Having family members outside the village	0.012 (0.028)	0.010 (0.018)	0.011 (0.018)	-0.035** (0.018)	-0.015 (0.020)
Participating in religious groups	-0.254*** (0.073)	0.112** (0.045)	0.095** (0.045)	-0.066 (0.043)	0.122** (0.049)
Participating in community projects	0.064 (0.084)	-0.015 (0.052)	-0.074 (0.051)	-0.055 (0.050)	-0.112* (0.058)
Contributing money to village projects	-0.133 (0.086)	-0.033 (0.049)	-0.016 (0.049)	-0.028 (0.047)	-0.154*** (0.052)
Working hard	-0.072*** (0.024)	-0.073*** (0.014)	-0.058*** (0.014)	-0.059*** (0.014)	-0.008 (0.015)
Friendliness	0.009 (0.027)	0.060*** (0.015)	0.031** (0.015)	0.048*** (0.015)	0.036** (0.017)
Total savings amount	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Share of savings in bank	-0.096 (0.165)	-0.538*** (0.086)	-0.526*** (0.084)	-0.236*** (0.075)	-0.451*** (0.074)
Share of debt	-0.044** (0.019)	-0.021*** (0.007)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.015*** (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.006)
Being ethnic minority	0.095 (0.084)	0.169*** (0.052)	0.093* (0.051)	0.260*** (0.050)	0.172*** (0.057)
Being religious minority	0.263 (0.245)	-0.195 (0.166)	-0.397** (0.172)	-0.358** (0.159)	-0.452*** (0.153)
Household head has elementary education or less	0.140 (0.092)	0.245*** (0.051)	0.253*** (0.050)	0.178*** (0.049)	0.266*** (0.055)
Household head is widow	0.351** (0.147)	-0.097 (0.106)	-0.009 (0.105)	-0.058 (0.104)	0.064 (0.120)
Household head is disabled	0.246** (0.123)	0.209** (0.089)	0.089 (0.089)	0.083 (0.087)	0.102 (0.104)
Household experienced death of family member	0.105 (0.227)	-0.025 (0.151)	0.080 (0.150)	0.200 (0.151)	0.315 (0.193)
Household has sick family member	0.040 (0.097)	0.131** (0.060)	0.108* (0.060)	0.023 (0.059)	-0.040 (0.067)
Household experienced income shock	-0.086 (0.074)	0.017 (0.045)	-0.045 (0.044)	-0.074* (0.043)	-0.019 (0.050)
Tobacco and/or alcohol consumption	0.509*** (0.155)	0.180* (0.107)	0.153 (0.105)	0.287*** (0.101)	0.476*** (0.129)
Constant	15.699*** (1.995)	9.436*** (1.093)	10.446*** (1.081)	8.047*** (1.028)	15.006*** (1.138)
Observations	3,992	3,981	3,981	3,992	3,992
Dependent Variable Mean	0.0601	0.362	0.388	0.425	0.751

Notes: Probit model from social welfare calculation. Each column shows a probit regression of benefit receipt on elite status, log per capita consumption, and other controls. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 12C: Probit Model of Benefit Receipt (Informal Elites)

VARIABLES	(1) PKH	(2) BLT 05	(3) BLT 08	(4) Jamkesmas	(5) Raskin
Elite	-0.146 (0.115)	-0.192*** (0.061)	-0.136** (0.060)	-0.261*** (0.058)	-0.112* (0.063)
Log per capita consumption	-0.076 (0.093)	-0.222*** (0.055)	-0.231*** (0.054)	-0.335*** (0.053)	-0.383*** (0.058)
PMT score	-1.292*** (0.146)	-0.559*** (0.082)	-0.608*** (0.081)	-0.304*** (0.077)	-0.702*** (0.087)
Log household size	0.071 (0.132)	0.003 (0.077)	0.008 (0.076)	0.082 (0.074)	-0.383*** (0.084)
Share of children in household	0.798*** (0.234)	0.602*** (0.139)	0.377*** (0.136)	0.186 (0.133)	0.237 (0.150)
Connected with other households	-0.022 (0.018)	0.015 (0.010)	0.015 (0.010)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.041*** (0.011)
Having family members outside the village	0.011 (0.028)	0.013 (0.018)	0.014 (0.018)	-0.031* (0.018)	-0.012 (0.020)
Participating in religious groups	-0.252*** (0.073)	0.125*** (0.045)	0.107** (0.045)	-0.046 (0.043)	0.133*** (0.049)
Participating in community projects	0.070 (0.084)	-0.007 (0.052)	-0.067 (0.051)	-0.042 (0.050)	-0.105* (0.058)
Contributing money to village projects	-0.130 (0.086)	-0.021 (0.049)	-0.004 (0.049)	-0.010 (0.047)	-0.144*** (0.052)
Working hard	-0.071*** (0.024)	-0.075*** (0.014)	-0.060*** (0.014)	-0.063*** (0.014)	-0.010 (0.015)
Friendliness	0.005 (0.026)	0.075*** (0.015)	0.048*** (0.015)	0.074*** (0.014)	0.049*** (0.016)
Total savings amount	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Share of savings in bank	-0.094 (0.165)	-0.527*** (0.086)	-0.514*** (0.084)	-0.219*** (0.075)	-0.443*** (0.074)
Share of debt	-0.044** (0.019)	-0.020*** (0.007)	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.014** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.006)
Being ethnic minority	0.089 (0.085)	0.160*** (0.052)	0.088* (0.051)	0.248*** (0.050)	0.166*** (0.058)
Being religious minority	0.279 (0.244)	-0.187 (0.166)	-0.398** (0.172)	-0.348** (0.159)	-0.446*** (0.154)
Household head has elementary education or less	0.138 (0.092)	0.228*** (0.051)	0.238*** (0.050)	0.150*** (0.049)	0.251*** (0.055)
Household head is widow	0.357** (0.146)	-0.100 (0.106)	-0.013 (0.105)	-0.062 (0.104)	0.061 (0.120)
Household head is disabled	0.241* (0.123)	0.203** (0.089)	0.085 (0.089)	0.075 (0.087)	0.098 (0.104)
Household experienced death of family member	0.099 (0.227)	-0.012 (0.151)	0.093 (0.150)	0.217 (0.151)	0.326* (0.193)
Household has sick family member	0.047 (0.097)	0.127** (0.060)	0.102* (0.060)	0.013 (0.059)	-0.045 (0.067)
Household experienced income shock	-0.088 (0.074)	0.024 (0.045)	-0.041 (0.044)	-0.065 (0.043)	-0.017 (0.050)
Tobacco and/or alcohol consumption	0.489*** (0.156)	0.172 (0.107)	0.151 (0.105)	0.277*** (0.101)	0.473*** (0.129)
Constant	15.688*** (1.996)	9.240*** (1.093)	10.257*** (1.080)	7.741*** (1.027)	14.888*** (1.138)
Observations	3,992	3,981	3,981	3,992	3,992
Dependent Variable Mean	0.0601	0.362	0.388	0.425	0.751

Notes: Probit model from social welfare calculation. Each column shows a probit regression of benefit receipt on elite status, log per capita consumption, and other controls. Standard errors clustered at the village level are listed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 13: Social Welfare Levels in PKH with Additional Counterfactual

	(1) PKH Experiment
<i>Panel A: Elites</i>	
Utility...	
Without program	-6.689
With Elite on	-6.593
With Elite off	-6.594
Under perfect PMT-targeting	-6.540
Under perfect consumption targeting	-6.333
Taking PPLS, then perfect PMT	-6.557
Share of possible utility gain...	
With Elite on	26.82%
With Elite off	26.57%
Under perfect PMT targeting	41.71%
Taking PPLS, then perfect PMT	36.99%
<i>Panel B: Formal Elites</i>	
Utility...	
Without program	-6.689
With Elite on	-6.593
With Elite off	-6.594
Under perfect PMT-targeting	-6.540
Under perfect consumption targeting	-6.333
Taking PPLS, then perfect PMT	-6.557
Share of possible utility gain...	
With Elite on	26.88%
With Elite off	26.63%
Under perfect PMT targeting	41.71%
Taking PPLS, then perfect PMT	36.99%
<i>Panel C: Informal Elites</i>	
Utility...	
Without program	-6.689
With Elite on	-6.593
With Elite off	-6.593
Under perfect PMT-targeting	-6.540
Under perfect consumption targeting	-6.333
Taking PPLS, then perfect PMT	-6.557
Share of possible utility gain...	
With Elite on	26.86%
With Elite off	26.77%
Under perfect PMT targeting	41.71%
Taking PPLS, then perfect PMT	36.99%

Notes: Utility is calculated as a monotonically increasing function of log per capita consumption, $u = -(\log(x)^2)/2$ (note that, under this formula, all utility is defined to be negative). Simulations are created with a probit model of benefit receipt, using our baseline calculations of consumption and PMT score, and a list of covariates. The probit model is shown in Appendix Table 12.

Appendix: Details on Experimental Design: NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Treatment 1: PPLS (Status Quo)

In this treatment, targeting was accomplished through a combination of a proxy-means test (PMT) and input from local village leaders. First, for each experimental district, the government created a formula that mapped easily observable household characteristics into a single index using regression techniques (i.e. the PMT formula).²⁹ Specifically, it created a list of 28 measures, encompassing the household's home attributes (wall type, roof type, etc.), assets (motorcycle, refrigerator, etc.), household composition, and household head's education and occupation. The measures also include location-based indicators, such as population density, distance to the district capital, existence of education and health facilities, and existence of semi-permanent marketplace. Using pre-existing surveys (SUSENAS (2010) and PODES (2008)), the government estimated the relationship between these variables and household per-capita consumption in order to create district-level formulas to predict consumption levels using these variables.³⁰ Individuals with scores below each district's very poor line would then be considered financially eligible for the program.

Conducting a full census of households to collect the data that are needed to predict each household's consumption is prohibitively expensive. As such, the Indonesian government harnesses local information to determine which households should be interviewed. Specifically, for each village, the government enumerators were given a pre-printed list of households from the last targeting survey (PPLS 2008). When they arrived at a village, the enumerators showed the village leadership the list and then asked them to add additional households to the list.³¹ The enumerators also had flexibility to add more households to the potential list of interviewees based on their own subjective observation of households. Of the 6,406 households on the list, 16 percent were eliminated based on the initial screen, and 5,383

²⁹ The government designed the PMT questionnaire (this was used as a pilot of the questionnaire for the 2011 nation-wide targeting efforts).

³⁰ On average, these regressions had an R^2 of 0.52.

³¹ For cost considerations, the new PMT was only conducted in the sub-village selected for our survey. In all remaining sub-villages, the government determined eligibility in the same manner as in the non-experimental districts, i.e. they used the PPLS 2008 data to determine eligibility.

households (or about 37.8 percent of the sub-villages) were given the full-PMT survey.³² After the data were collected and entered, each household was assigned a predicted consumption score based on the PMT formula. Those who were below the district's very poor line were considered as beneficiaries.

Main Treatment 2: Community Input

In the community-input treatment, the list of beneficiaries was determined through a poverty-ranking exercise that was conducted at a village meeting. First, the facilitator visited each sub-village in the village, informed the sub-village head about the program, and set a date for a community meeting. To vary the level of elite control in the meetings, we randomly varied who was invited to them: in half of the villages (randomly selected), we asked the local sub-village head to invite 5-8 local leaders, both formal and informal, to the meetings. In the other half, the full community was invited to the meetings so that the full community could potentially provide a check on the power of the elites to capture the targeting process. The facilitator and sub-village head heavily advertised the meeting to encourage full attendance. In many cases, the facilitators made door-to-door household visits in order to encourage attendance. On average, 15 percent of households in the village attended the meetings in the elite sub-treatment, while 59 percent did so in the community sub-treatment.

At the meeting, the facilitator first explained PKH and the purpose of the program. Having answered questions about the program itself, the facilitator would then display cards listing the poorest households in the sub-village according to the official poverty census (PPLS 08). The number of cards shown was roughly 75 percent of the sub-village's quota. Consulting the meeting attendants, the facilitator removed households with inaccurate information, i.e., households that a) no longer lived in the

³² The pre-screening consists of 5 questions: is the household's average income per month in the past three months more than IDR 1,000,000 (USD 110); was the average transfer received per month in the past three months more than IDR 1,000,000 (USD 110); did they own a TV or refrigerator that cost more than IDR 1,000,000 (USD 110); was the value of their livestock productive building, and large agricultural tools owned more IDR 1,500,000 (USD 167); did they own a motor vehicle; and did they own jewelry worth more than IDR 1,000,000 (USD 100). Households that answered yes on either four or five of the questions were instantly disqualified and the survey ended.

sub-village, or b) did not own at least one out of the three PKH criteria. The remaining households comprise the “poverty census” list.

To compile the next list (the “brainstorm” list), the facilitator first asked the meeting attendants to discuss characteristics they would associate with poverty in their sub-village. Next, the meeting attendants were asked to brainstorm for households they thought to be the most deserving of PKH in their sub-village, up to 100 percent of the sub-village’s quota. After ensuring all the households listed own at least one of the three PKH criteria, the remaining households comprise the “brainstorm” list. At this point, the facilitator calculates the total number of households from both the poverty census and the brainstorm lists. In virtually all meetings, this number exceeds 100 percent of the sub-village’s quota, so the facilitator leads the meeting attendants through a ranking exercise.

The ranking exercise that follows depended on which sub-treatment was used in the village. We randomly divided the villages into one of two sub-treatments: *Add vs. Add and Replace*. In the *Add* villages, attendants were asked to rank only the households in the brainstorm list, while the portion of the list that came from the last targeting survey remained unchanged. In the *Add and Replace* villages, attendants were asked to rank everyone in the combined list, allowing them to replace households from the last targeting survey.

The facilitator began the ranking exercise by shuffling the index cards with names of households to rank. They then presented the first two name cards from the stack to the attendants and asked, “Which of these two households is less well-off than the other?” Based on the attendants’ response, the facilitator attached the cards to the wall in order. The facilitator then took another name from the stack and compared this name to the names on the wall. The process continued until all the index cards made up a sequential list, with one end labeled as “most well-off” (*paling mampū*) and the other side labeled as “poorest” (*paling miskin*). The final list of recipients were then determined based on the sub-village’s quota.