

APPENDIX NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Appendix 1: Sampling

In the first follow up survey, we identified the set of hamlets in each village that had at least one targeted beneficiary and had not been randomly selected to be surveyed in the previous experiment; we then randomly selected one hamlet from this set. Within each hamlet, we selected 8 households to be surveyed for a total of 4,571 households. Of these 8 households, we oversampled beneficiaries as they were the focus of the study, and thus we randomly selected 5 households from the beneficiary listing and 3 from a hamlet census. The 5 randomly chosen beneficiaries were stratified by whether they were classified as very poor (the bottom 10th decile) or other eligible households. A fraction of those who were randomly chosen from the census were eligible and thus are classified as such in the analysis. We also surveyed the village head.

For the second follow-up survey (March and April 2013), we returned to the hamlet that we had surveyed in the previous experiment, so that we could survey a fraction of the households for whom we had baseline data. There is substantial heterogeneity across hamlets within a village, and thus the strategy of sampling in different hamlets allowed us to better capture this variation. Moreover, since the households surveyed in the second follow-up were in a different hamlet than those in the first, we are less concerned that any “monitoring effects” that could arise as a result of the first survey on the card use would influence how the card program functioned in the areas surveyed for the second follow-up (Zwane, Alix, et al. 2011). We surveyed 10 to 11 households per village, for a total of 5,706 households using a similar questionnaire to the first follow-up. We oversampled the beneficiaries (about 6 to 7 per village) and then sampled the remaining households from the random sample of households we surveyed in the previous experiment. For the beneficiary sample, we sampled all eligible households that we had previously surveyed and then supplemented this with a random sample of eligible households from the government listing. In a few cases, we did not have enough ineligible households to choose from in our previous survey; in these cases, we randomly selected additional households from the hamlet census. Again, we surveyed the village head.

Appendix 2. Model Proofs

Lemma 1. If either of the following conditions is satisfied, then it is optimal for the leader to offer the same $X_i = X_e$ to all eligible, and the same $X_i = X_n$ to all ineligible:

- i. If $G_e(Y)$ and $G_n(Y)$ are uniform distributions, and both include C in their support, that is, $G_i(C) > 0$ for $i = e, n$. That is, there exists some people who will not complain even when offered zero.
- ii. If $F(\mu)$ is weakly concave in total complaints $\mu = \alpha\mu_e + (1 - \alpha)\mu_n$.

Proof. Assume without loss of generality that individuals are ordered such that those between 0 and α are eligible, and the rest ineligible. The leader's problem is to choose the measurable function $X: [0,1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ that maximizes the objective function:

$$\int_0^\alpha (B - X(i) - Z_e)G_e(X(i) + C) di + \int_\alpha^1 (B - X(i) - Z_n)G_n(X(i) + C) di + \\ + \delta V \left(1 - F \left(\int_0^\alpha (1 - G_e(X(i) + C)) di + \int_\alpha^1 (1 - G_n(X(i) + C)) di \right) \right)$$

For part (i), consider a candidate solution function X . Consider the eligible first. Note that the leader would never offer a villager more than is required to ensure zero protest probability; that is, $X(i) \leq B_e + \Delta_e - C$ for $i \in [0, \alpha]$. Together with the hypothesis $G_e(C) > 0$, this implies that $1 - G_e(X + C)$ is a linear function for X in the support of $X(i)$ for $i \in [0, \alpha]$. Note also that $(B - X - Z_e)G_e(X + C)$ is a quadratic concave function for X in the same support. Similar statements apply for the ineligible. It follows that the leader can weakly increase his payoff by offering the eligible $X_e^* = \frac{1}{\alpha} \int_0^\alpha X(i) di$ and offering the ineligible $X_n^* = \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \int_\alpha^1 X(i) di$. Indeed, by offering these amounts the current period payoff increases, leaving the level of complaints (and thus future payoffs) constant.

For part (ii), note that $\delta V(1 - F(\cdot))$ is convex. We first show that the leader can always do better by offering the same $X(i)$ to all of the eligible households. Holding the allocation to ineligible constant, by Jensen's inequality, the third term in the objective function satisfies:

$$\delta V \left(1 - F \left(\int_0^\alpha (1 - G_e(X(i) + C)) di + \underbrace{\int_\alpha^1 (1 - G_n(X(i) + C)) di}_{M_n} \right) \right) \leq$$

$$\int_0^\alpha \delta V \left(1 - F(\alpha(1 - G_e(X(i) + C)) + M_n) \right) di$$

Consider $X_e^{**} \in \arg \max_{X_e} \alpha(B - X_e - Z_e)G_e(X_e + C) + \delta V \left(1 - F(\alpha(1 - G_e(X_e + C)) + M_n) \right)$, then the

objective function is upper bounded by:

$$\begin{aligned} & \alpha(B - X_e^{**} - Z_e)G_e(X_e^{**} + C) + \int_\alpha^1 (B - X(i) - Z_n)G_n(X(i) + C)di + \\ & + \delta V \left(1 - F(\alpha(1 - G_e(X_e^{**} + C)) + M_n) \right) \end{aligned}$$

A similar argument now applies to the ineligible, hence there exists X_n^{**} and the objective function is bounded above by:

$$\begin{aligned} & \alpha(B - X_e^{**} - Z_e)G_e(X_e^{**} + C) + (1 - \alpha)(B - X_n^{**} - Z_n)G_n(X_n^{**} + C) + \\ & + \delta V \left(1 - F \left(\alpha(1 - G_e(X_e^{**} + C)) + (1 - \alpha)(1 - G_n(X_n^{**} + C)) \right) \right) \end{aligned}$$

The above expression is the objective function when the leader offers X_i^{**} to everyone in group $i = e, n$.

Hence, we have shown that the leader can always do at least as good by offering the same X to everyone in the same eligibility group. ■

Result 1: Starting from an equilibrium where $X_e + C \geq B_e$, so that a majority of eligible households were not complaining absent the intervention, $\frac{\partial X_e}{\partial \Delta_e} < 0$, $\frac{\partial X_n}{\partial \Delta_e} < 0$, $\frac{\partial \mu_e}{\partial \Delta_e} > 0$ and, $\frac{\partial \mu_n}{\partial \Delta_e} > 0$, i.e. decreasing the variance of eligible households' beliefs increases transfers to both eligible and ineligible, and both groups complain less. If the variance of the beliefs of the eligible goes down starting from an equilibrium where $X_e + C < B_e$, $\frac{\partial X_e}{\partial \Delta_e}$ and $\frac{\partial \mu_e}{\partial \Delta_e}$ are of ambiguous sign and $\frac{\partial X_n}{\partial \Delta_e} > 0$ $\frac{\partial \mu_n}{\partial \Delta_e} < 0$, i.e., it is ambiguous what happens to the eligible, but the ineligible receive less and complain more.

Proof. Consider first the case when $X_e + C \geq B_e$. Consider $\tilde{\Delta}_e < \Delta_e$, and denote $\tilde{G}_e(\cdot)$ the CDF when the spread of beliefs of the eligible is $\tilde{\Delta}_e$ (and all other parameters do not change), by $\tilde{V}(\cdot, \cdot)$ the leader's value function, and by \tilde{X}_e and \tilde{X}_n the corresponding optimal amounts. Because \tilde{X}_e and \tilde{X}_n are chosen optimally, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{V}(\tilde{X}_e, \tilde{X}_n) &\geq \tilde{V}(X_e, X_n) = \\ &= \frac{\alpha(B - X_e - Z_e)\tilde{G}_e(X_e + C) + \alpha Z_e + (1 - \alpha)(B - X_n - Z_n)G_n(X_n + C) + (1 - \alpha)Z_n}{1 - \delta \left(1 - F \left(\alpha(1 - \tilde{G}_e(X_e + C)) + (1 - \alpha)((1 - G_n(X_n + C))) \right) \right)} \end{aligned}$$

Note that the above expression is increasing in $\tilde{G}_e(X_e + C)$. The assumption $X_e + C \geq B_e$ together with $\tilde{\Delta}_e < \Delta_e$ imply that $\tilde{G}_e(X_e + C) \geq G_e(X_e + C)$. It follows that $\tilde{V}(\tilde{X}_e, \tilde{X}_n) \geq V(X_e, X_n)$. So in this case V goes up when Δ_e decreases. Therefore, from equation 7, X_n must go up as well. Since X_n goes up and the $G_n(\cdot)$ is unchanged, complaints by the ineligible μ_n must go down. From equation 6, X_e must go up as well, and complaints by the eligible μ_e go down as well because:

$$1 - \tilde{\mu}_e = \tilde{G}_e(\tilde{X}_e + C) \geq \tilde{G}_e(X_e + C) \geq G_e(X_e + C) = 1 - \mu_e.$$

Consider now the case when $X_e + C < B_e$. An argument similar to the one above shows that $\tilde{V}(\tilde{X}_e, \tilde{X}_n) \leq V(X_e, X_n)$, so V goes down and X_n must go down as well, and complaints by the ineligible go up. From equation 6 we see why the effect on X_e and on complaints by the eligible can go either way since Δ_e goes down but V goes down as well. This is confirmed by the simulations reported below ■

Result 2. $\frac{\partial X_e}{\partial B_e}$ has ambiguous sign, so increasing the mean beliefs of the eligible does not necessarily increase the benefits they receive. Moreover, $\frac{\partial \mu_e}{\partial B_e} > 0$, $\frac{\partial X_n}{\partial B_e} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial \mu_n}{\partial B_e} > 0$.

Proof. Consider $\tilde{B}_e > B_e$, and denote $\tilde{G}_e(\cdot)$ the CDF when the mean belief of the eligible is \tilde{B}_e (and all other parameters do not change), by $\tilde{V}(\cdot, \cdot)$ the leader's value function, and by \tilde{X}_e and \tilde{X}_n the corresponding optimal amounts. Since X_e and X_n are chosen optimally for $V(\cdot, \cdot)$, we have $V(X_e, X_n) \geq V(\tilde{X}_e, \tilde{X}_n)$. Next, the fact that B_e goes up implies that $G_e(\tilde{X}_e + C) > \tilde{G}_e(\tilde{X}_e + C)$, hence $V(\tilde{X}_e, \tilde{X}_n) \geq \tilde{V}(\tilde{X}_e, \tilde{X}_n)$. We conclude that V goes down when B_e goes up. Equation 7 implies that the ineligible receive less and complain more. Equation 6 implies that $2X_e - B_e = X_e + (X_e - B_e)$ goes down. Given that B_e goes up this implies that $X_e - B_e$ goes down, and therefore complaints $1 - G_e(X_e + C) = 1 - \frac{X_e - B_e + \Delta_e}{2\Delta_e}$ go up. Also

from equation 6 we see why the effect on X_e can go either way since B_e goes up but V goes down. This is confirmed by the simulations shown below.

The results in the paper examined changes in information for eligible. The following states the result for changes for ineligible, and considers as well changes in costs of complains:

Result 4. *Starting from an equilibrium where $X_n + C \geq B_e$, so a majority of ineligible households were not complaining, we have $\frac{\partial X_e}{\partial \Delta_n} < 0$, $\frac{\partial X_e}{\partial B_n} < 0$ and $\frac{\partial \mu_e}{\partial \Delta_n} > 0$, $\frac{\partial \mu_e}{\partial B_n} > 0$. That is, improving ineligibles' information, by raising their mean belief, by making them more precise, or both, increases benefits for the eligible and reduce their complaints. Also reducing the cost of complaining, C , decreases benefits and increases complaints for both groups.*

Proof. For the first part, we apply Results 1 and 2, switching eligible and ineligible.

For the second part, consider $\tilde{C} < C$, and denote by $\tilde{V}(\cdot, \cdot)$ the leader's value function when the cost is \tilde{C} , and by \tilde{X}_e and \tilde{X}_n the corresponding optimal amounts. Because X_e and X_n are chosen optimally for $V(\cdot, \cdot)$, we have $V(X_e, X_n) \geq V(\tilde{X}_e, \tilde{X}_n)$. Next, $G_i(\tilde{X}_i + C) > G_i(\tilde{X}_i + \tilde{C})$, hence $V(\tilde{X}_e, \tilde{X}_n) \geq \tilde{V}(\tilde{X}_e, \tilde{X}_n)$. We conclude that the future value V goes down when the cost to complain decreases. Equations 6 and 7 imply that both eligible and ineligible receive less, and complain more. ■

Appendix 3: Simulating the Model

In this Appendix, we explore the implications of the model numerically. We choose the following parameter values. The eligible comprise $\alpha = 25\%$ of the population. The total Raskin benefit is normalized to $B = 90$, and the beliefs of eligible are given by $B_e = 60$ and $\Delta_e = 30$, and those of ineligible are given by $B_n = 30$ and $\Delta_n = 30$. The cost to complain is $C = 10$. The leader's payoffs when eligible and ineligible complain are $Z_e = 30$ and $Z_n = 60$. The probability that he continues as the leader in the next period is given by $F(\mu) = 1 - \mu/2$, where $\mu = \alpha\mu_e + (1 - \alpha)\mu_n$ is the total number of complaints. The leader's discount factor is $\delta = 0.8$.

The optimal choice by the leader, under these parameter values, is to choose $X_e^* = 73.3$ and $X_n^* = 43.3$. It then follows that 11 percent of the eligible and 11 percent of the ineligible households complain.

Figure 4 shows the results of varying the variance and level of beliefs of the eligible. Each subfigure plots the proportional change in the outcome variable (eligible/ineligible benefits/complaints, and the value of being a leader) due to a change in B_e (X axis) and a change in Δ_e (Y axis). Consistent with Result 1, Figure 4 shows that a marginal tightening of the beliefs of the eligible (lower Δ_e on the Y axis) increases the benefit level and decreases complaints for both eligible and ineligible. In addition, more optimistic beliefs of the eligible (higher B_e on the X axis) increase benefits for the eligible and decrease those for the ineligible, while complaints go up for both groups, which is consistent with Result 2.

With the exception of eligible benefits, the effects of tightening the beliefs and making them more optimistic go in opposite directions. Thus, the combined effect (the lower right quadrant of each subfigure) depends on which margin is changed more. In the case of benefits and complaints by the ineligible, the combined effect is roughly linear in the two individual effects, with equal strengths. In the case of complaints by the eligible, the combined effect is roughly linear, with the change in Δ_e having a stronger effect.

We now compute numerically the set of parameter values for which the model predictions are consistent with what we find empirically. Assume that the baseline parameters chosen above correspond to the control group, namely $\Delta_e^c = \Delta_e = 30$ and $B_e^c = B_e = 60$, and the corresponding parameter in the treatment group are denoted Δ_e^t and B_e^t . The region delimited by a white line, shown in each subplot in Figure 4, is the set of changes $(\Delta_e^t - \Delta_e^c, B_e^t - B_e^c)$ such that in the treatment group the eligible receive higher benefits and complain less than in the control group, while the opposite happens for ineligible.

Finally, we show a numeric example where everyone's information improves, and the cost to complain falls, and the result on benefits and complaints is consistent with what we observe empirically. The control parameters are as above. In treatment areas, we have $B_e^t = B_e^c + 10 = 70$, $\Delta_e^t = \Delta_e^c - 8 = 22$,

$B_n^t = B_n^e - 4 = 26$, $\Delta_n^t = \Delta_n^e - 1 = 29$ and $C^t = C^c - 5 = 10$. The results are summarized in the following table:

	Eligible Benefits X_e	Ineligible Benefits X_n	Eligible Complaints μ_e	Ineligible Complaints μ_n
Control	73.3	43.3	11.2%	11.2%
Treatment	83.1	42.5	8.9%	12.9%
Percent Difference	13.4%	-1.7%	-20.5%	14.5%

Appendix 4: Additional Appendix Tables

Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Control Group

	Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Observations (1)	Mean (2)	Std. Dev (3)	Observations (4)	Mean (5)	Std. Dev (6)
<i>Panel A: Card Receipt and Use</i>						
Received Card	2,275	0.07	0.25	1,207	0.05	0.22
Used Card	2,275	0.06	0.24	1,207	0.04	0.20
Knows Own Status	2,275	0.30	0.46	1,207	0.36	0.48
<i>Panel B: Rice Purchases and Price</i>						
Bought in the Last 2 Months	2,275	0.79	0.40	1,207	0.63	0.48
Amount Purchased (Kg)	2,274	5.29	4.28	1,207	3.46	3.78
Price (Rp.)	1,923	2,276	461	813	2,251	461
Subsidy (Rp.)	2,274	28,605	23,653	1,207	18,754	20,609

Note: This table provides summary statistics for key outcome variables for the control group, by official eligibility status. The data are pooled from both the first and second follow-up survey.

Appendix Table 2: Randomization Check for Card Treatment

	N	Means		Difference Between Treatment and Control	
		Control	Treatment	No Controls	Stratum Fixed Effects
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log consumption	5718	13.11	13.11	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
PMT Score	5720	12.79	12.79	0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Household Head Years of Education	5693	7.14	7.28	0.14 (0.18)	0.15 (0.13)
RT Head Years of Education	570	7.95	8.34	0.39 (0.31)	0.44 (0.30)
Village Distance to Kecamatan	572	6.48	7.27	0.79 (1.16)	0.25 (1.06)
Percentage of agriculture households in RT	572	0.07	0.07	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Log Number of Households in RT	572	4.20	4.28	0.08* (0.04)	0.09* (0.04)
Number of Primary Schools per 1,000 Households	572	2.74	2.62	-0.12 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.12)
Log village size	572	4.02	3.95	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.07)
Number of Religious buildings per 1,000 Households	572	4.88	4.75	-0.12 (0.32)	-0.00 (0.24)
Joint test Chi square				7.84	14.23
Joint test P-value				0.64	0.16

Note: This table provides a check on the randomization for the main card treatment. The data come from the baseline survey. Columns 2 and 3 report the variable mean in the control and treatment groups, respectively. We then provide the difference in means with no controls (Column 4) and with strata fixed effects (Column 5). Joint significance Chi square tests across the multiple outcomes are reported. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 3: Randomization Check for Card Variations

	N	Public – Standard Information	Cards to all - Bottom 10	Price - No Price	Coupons - No Coupons
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Log consumption	3779	0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
PMT Score	3780	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Household Head Years of Education	3765	-0.05 (0.19)	-0.04 (0.15)	-0.09 (0.18)	0.09 (0.19)
RT Head Years of Education	376	-0.22 (0.51)	0.53 (0.41)	0.04 (0.51)	0.14 (0.47)
Village Distance to Kecamatan	378	-0.69 (0.96)	2.06 (2.46)	4.15 (3.20)	1.73 (2.30)
Percentage of agriculture households in RT	378	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Log Number of Households in RT	378	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.05 (0.07)	0.02 (0.07)
Number of Primary Schools per 1,000 Households	378	-0.03 (0.20)	0.10 (0.14)	0.19 (0.18)	-0.23 (0.22)
Log village size	378	0.02 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.10)
Number of Religious buildings per 1,000 Households	378	-0.22 (0.35)	-0.23 (0.27)	0.65** (0.31)	0.06 (0.37)
Joint test Chi square		8.89	15.55	11.68	14.70
Joint test P-value		0.54	0.11	0.31	0.14

Note: This table provides a check on the randomization for card variations. The data come from the baseline survey. All of the differences presented are conditional on strata fixed effects. In the last two rows, we additionally report the joint significance Chi square tests across the multiple outcomes in each column. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 4: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Card Receipt and Use, Varying Controls

	Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Knows own status (3)	Received Card (4)	Used Card (5)	Knows own status (6)
	<i>Panel A: No Controls</i>					
Card Treatment	0.28*** (0.02)	0.14*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05* (0.02)
	<i>Panel B: Adding Month Fixed Effects to Table 1 specification</i>					
Card Treatment	0.30*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)
	<i>Panel C: Adding Additional Baseline Controls to Table 1 specification</i>					
Card Treatment Controls and Additional Controls	0.30*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)
Observations	5,693	5,693	5,691	3,619	3,619	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.07	0.06	0.30	0.05	0.04	0.36

Note: This table replicates Table 1, but with varying sets of controls. In Panel A, we omit all control variables. In Panel B, we add month fixed effects to the specification in Table 1, while we additionally include the 10 baseline variables from Appendix Table 2 in Panel C. Standard errors are clustered by village.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 5: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Card Receipt and Use, Regional Heterogeneity

	Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Knows own status (3)	Received Card (4)	Used Card (5)	Knows own status (6)
Card Treatment x Java	0.39*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Card Treatment x Off Java	0.24*** (0.02)	0.13*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
<i>Difference:</i>						
Treatment Java - Treatment Off Java	0.15*** (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.07* (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.04)
Observations	5,693	5,693	5,691	3,619	3,619	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.07	0.06	0.30	0.05	0.04	0.36

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the card treatment group interacted with region on card receipt and use by eligibility status. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, the interaction with region, strata fixed effects, and survey sample dummies. Java is a dummy for the 96 villages located on the island of Java, and Off-Java is a dummy for the remaining 372 villages. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. Standard errors are clustered by village.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 6: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Rice Purchases and Price, Varying Controls

	Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)
	<i>Panel A: No Controls</i>							
Card Treatment	0.02 (0.02)	1.24*** (0.27)	-50 (33)	7,241*** (1,480)	-0.07** (0.03)	0.08 (0.21)	-6 (36)	512 (1,150)
	<i>Panel B: Adding Month Fixed Effects to Table 2 Specification</i>							
Card Treatment	0.02 (0.01)	1.25*** (0.23)	-57*** (18)	7,499*** (1,318)	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.07 (0.19)	-36 (23)	563 (1,031)
	<i>Panel C: Adding Additional Baseline Controls to Table 2 Specification</i>							
Card Treatment	0.02 (0.01)	1.25*** (0.24)	-57*** (18)	7,455*** (1,328)	-0.06*** (0.02)	0.07 (0.19)	-35 (24)	526 (1,035)
Observations	5,693	5,692	4,881	5,692	3,619	3,619	2,283	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.79	5.29	2,276	28,605	0.63	3.46	2,251	18,754

Note: This table replicates Table 2, but with varying sets of controls. In Panel A, we omit all control variables. In Panel B, we add month fixed effects to the specification in Table 2, while we additionally include the 10 baseline variables from Appendix Table 2 in Panel C. Standard errors are clustered by village.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 7: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Rice Purchases and Price, Regional Heterogeneity

	Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)
Card Treatment x Java	0.06** (0.02)	1.77*** (0.38)	-58** (25)	10,641*** (2,307)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.08 (0.22)	-35 (31)	-355 (1,300)
Card Treatment x Off Java	-0.00 (0.02)	0.94*** (0.29)	-56** (24)	5,552*** (1,596)	-0.06** (0.02)	0.16 (0.27)	-35 (34)	1,100 (1,483)
<i>Difference:</i> Treatment Java – Treatment Off Java	0.06* (0.03)	0.83* (0.48)	-1 (35)	5,089* (2,806)	0.00 (0.04)	-0.24 (0.35)	0 (46)	-1,455 (1,972)
Observations	5,693	5,692	4,881	5,692	3,619	3,619	2,283	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.79	5.29	2,276	28,605	0.63	3.46	2,251	18,754

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the card treatment group interacted with region on rice purchases and price by eligibility status. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, the interaction with region, strata fixed effects, and survey sample dummies. Java is a dummy for the 96 villages located on the island of Java, and Off-Java is a dummy for the remaining 372 villages. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 8: Relative Weight Estimates from Weighing Test

	Weight Estimate (Respondent FE) (1)	Weight Estimate (No FE) (2)
Packet Weighing 6kg	1.56*** (0.33)	1.56*** (0.29)
Packet Weighing 7kg	3.97*** (0.50)	3.97*** (0.44)
Packet Weighing 8kg	4.75*** (0.75)	4.75*** (0.65)
Number of observations	72	72
Mean Weight Estimate for Packet Weighing 4kg	3.92	3.92
P-Values of Difference 6kg - 7kg	0.00	0.00
P-Values of Difference 6kg - 8kg	0.00	0.00
P-Values of Difference 7kg - 8kg	0.26	0.19

Note: This table provides the results of a weighing test in which eighteen eligible households in our sample guessed the weights of 4 packets of rice (in random order) that weighed 4, 6, 7, and 8kg. The table comes from an OLS regression of weight estimate on dummies for each packet. Column (1) includes respondent fixed effects, while Column (2) does not. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 9: Reduced Form Effect of Card Treatment on Rice Purchases and Price, Conditional on Purchase

	Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Amount Purchased (Kg) (1)	Price (Rp.) (2)	Subsidy (Rp.) (3)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (4)	Price (Rp.) (5)	Subsidy (Rp.) (6)
Card Treatment	1.25*** (0.24)	-57*** (18)	7,452*** (1,390)	0.53** (0.23)	-35 (24)	3,181** (1,309)
Observations	4,885	4,881	4,885	2,286	2,283	2,286
Control Group Mean	6.20	2,276	33,502	5.19	2,251	28,118

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the card treatment group on rice purchases by eligibility status, conditional on buying subsidized rice. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, strata fixed effects, and survey sample dummies. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up surveys. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month (as the Raskin rice is distributed after that day). The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice, whereas the price is calculated among purchasing households. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 10: Effect of Card Treatment on Protests and Complaints

	Indicator for whether village leaders reports any...				
	“Protests” (1)	“Complaints” by those who receive rice (2)	“Complaints” by those who do not receive rice (3)	“Complaints” about list of beneficiaries (4)	“Complaints” about distribution process (5)
<i>Panel A: Survey Round 1 (Approximately 2 months)</i>					
Card Treatment	0.09*** (0.03)	-0.06 (0.05)	0.10** (0.04)	0.14*** (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
Number of observations	572	572	572	572	572
Control Group Mean	0.09	0.39	0.19	0.16	0.29
<i>Panel B: Survey Round 2 (Approximately 8 months)</i>					
Card Treatment	0.05 (0.03)	-0.13*** (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.05)
Number of observations	571	572	572	572	572
Control Group Mean	0.13	0.46	0.26	0.20	0.53
P-Value of Difference 1 - 2	0.39	0.28	0.30	0.02	0.48

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the card treatment group on village leaders' reports of protests or complaints related to the Raskin program in the 12 months preceding the survey, separated by survey round. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment and strata fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 11: Effect of Public Information on Seeing the Eligibility List, Dropping “Do Not Know” Answers

	Eligible (1)	Ineligible (2)	Village officials (3)	Informal Leaders (4)
<i>Panel A: Respondent has seen the list</i>				
Public Information	0.15*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.22*** (0.07)	0.12* (0.07)
Standard Information	0.02 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.09 (0.07)	0.05 (0.07)
<i>Difference:</i>				
Public - Standard	0.13*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.12 (0.08)	0.07 (0.07)
Observations	5,379	3,443	484	375
Control Group Mean	0.07	0.07	0.37	0.13
<i>Panel B: Respondent believes that stated category of individuals has seen the list</i>				
Public Information	0.49*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.05)	0.22*** (0.06)	0.34*** (0.06)
Standard Information	0.10* (0.06)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.02 (0.06)	0.07 (0.07)
<i>Difference:</i>				
Public - Standard	0.39*** (0.07)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.07)	0.27*** (0.07)
Observations	5,530	5,324	5,661	5,151
Control Group Mean	0.53	0.27	1.78	0.87

Note: This table replicates Panel A of Table 5A and Panel A of Table 5B, but drops the observations if the individual answered “do not know.” Each regression is estimated by OLS and includes strata fixed effects and survey sample dummies. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. In Panel A (which corresponds to Table 5A, Panel A), the sample is the stated category in the column and the outcome is a dummy indicating whether the individual has seen the eligibility list. Panel B (which corresponds to Table 5B, Panel A) includes all survey respondents. The outcome is whether the respondent believes that individuals of the stated category have seen the list; the variable is scaled between 0 and 3, where 0 corresponds to “have not seen the list” and 3 corresponds to “most have seen the list.” Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Standard errors are clustered by village *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 12: Effect of Public Information on Beneficiary Status Knowledge, by Eligibility Status

	Eligible (1)	Ineligible (2)	Village officials (3)	Informal Leaders (4)
<i>Panel A: Respondent is Eligible</i>				
Public Information	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Standard Information	0.02 (0.01)	0.05*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
<i>Difference:</i>				
Public - Standard	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.09* (0.05)
Observations	39,008	21,106	2,556	2,468
Control Group Mean	0.67	0.31	0.60	0.61
<i>Panel B: Respondent is Ineligible</i>				
Public Information	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)
Standard Information	0.02 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.05)	0.06 (0.04)
<i>Difference:</i>				
Public - Standard	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.05 (0.05)	-0.12*** (0.05)
Observations	25,634	13,686	1,599	1,748
Control Group Mean	0.66	0.34	0.58	0.67

Note: This table replicates Panel B in Table 5B by eligibility status of the respondent. Each regression is estimated by OLS and includes strata fixed effects and survey sample dummies. The outcome is whether the individual correctly identified other households in their village within each of the categories listed in the columns. “Do not know” answers are coded as zero. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 13: Effect of Public Information on Protests and Complaints

	Indicator for whether village leaders reports any...				
	“Protests” (1)	“Complaints” by those who receive rice (2)	“Complaints” by those who do not receive rice (3)	“Complaints” about list of beneficiaries (4)	“Complaints” about distribution process (5)
Public Information	0.11*** (0.03)	-0.09** (0.04)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	-0.06 (0.04)
Standard Information	0.03 (0.02)	-0.10** (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.07* (0.04)
<i>Difference:</i>					
Public - Standard	0.08*** (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.11*** (0.04)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.04)
Observations	1,143	1,144	1,144	1,144	1,144
Control Group Mean	0.11	0.43	0.22	0.18	0.41

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the public information treatment group on village leaders' reports of protests or complaints related to the Raskin program in the 12 months preceding the survey. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, strata fixed effects, and survey wave indicator. Data are pooled from village leader module of the first and second follow-up surveys. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 14: Does Public Information Affect Subsidy Only Through Card Receipt?
Implied Instrumental Variables Estimation

	Public Information (1)	Standard Information (2)
Received Card	32,623*** (4,696)	17,213*** (5,885)
Observations	4,000	3,958
Control Group Mean	28,605	28,605
P-value (1)-(2)		0.03

Note: This table provides the instrumental variables estimation of the effect of receiving the card on the subsidy. The two instruments used are the enhanced public information treatment (Column 1) and the standard information treatment (Column 2). Each column in this table comes from a separate IV regression of the subsidy on the endogenous variable received card, with instruments given by the column header, and other regressors: the strata fixed effects and survey sample dummies. The last row contains the p-value of the difference between the two implied coefficients for the received card variable from columns (1) and (2). Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the subsidy is an average over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month (as the Raskin rice is distributed after that day). The subsidy is set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 15: Does Advertising Affect Subsidy Only Through Card Receipt? Implied Instrumental Variables Estimation, First Stage and Reduced Form

	First Stage: Received Card		Reduced Form: Subsidy (Rp.)	
	Public Information (1)	Standard Information (2)	Public Information (3)	Standard Information (4)
Public Information	0.32*** (0.02)		10,318*** (1,593)	
Standard Information		0.25*** (0.03)		4,366*** (1,610)
Observations	4,001	3,959	4,000	3,958
Control Group Mean	0.07	0.07	28,605	28,605

Note: This table provides the first stage and reduced form regressions for the IV estimates in Appendix Table 15. In the first two columns, the endogenous variable received card is regressed on the public and standard information treatments respectively. Column 1 omits households from villages randomly assigned to the standard information treatment, and Column 2 omits households from villages randomly assigned to the public information treatment. Columns 3 and 4 present the reduced form regression of subsidy received on public and standard information treatments respectively. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the subsidy is an average over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month (as the Raskin rice is distributed after that day). The subsidy is set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 16: Effect of Printing Price on Cards on Card Receipt and Use

	Eligible Households		Ineligible Households	
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Received Card (3)	Used Card (4)
Cards with Printed Price	0.26*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.03)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Cards without Price	0.25*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
<i>Difference:</i>				
Price - No Price	0.02 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Observations	5,688	5,688	3,615	3,615
Control Group Mean	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.04

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the Price and No Price treatment groups on card outcomes and knowledge, by eligibility status, as compared to the control group. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, strata fixed effects, survey sample dummies, and a dummy for whether the village was also in the public information treatment. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 17: Effect of Printing Price on Cards on Rice Purchases and Price, Conditional on Public Information

	Eligible Households				Ineligible Households			
	Bought in the Last 2 Months (1)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (2)	Price (Rp.) (3)	Subsidy (Rp.) (4)	Bought in the Last 2 Months (5)	Amount Purchased (Kg) (6)	Price (Rp.) (7)	Subsidy (Rp.) (8)
Cards with Printed Price x Public Information	0.00 (0.03)	0.81 (0.52)	-34 (36)	4,645 (2,925)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.47 (0.38)	-44 (45)	-2,506 (2,052)
Cards without Price x Public Information	0.02 (0.03)	1.14** (0.45)	-1 (31)	6,382*** (2,461)	-0.03 (0.04)	0.56 (0.36)	-43 (36)	3,336* (1,957)
Cards with Printed Price	0.02 (0.02)	1.38*** (0.38)	-56* (30)	8,201*** (2,179)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.28 (0.30)	-26 (34)	1,782 (1,602)
Cards without Printed Price	0.01 (0.02)	0.09 (0.37)	-41 (26)	969 (2,023)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.21 (0.30)	-1 (32)	-1,308 (1,616)
<i>Difference:</i>								
Price and Public – Price and Standard	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.57 (0.81)	22 (60)	-3,556 (4,603)	0.00 (0.07)	-0.75 (0.61)	-19 (69)	-4,287 (3,299)
Observations	5,688	5,687	4,877	5,687	3,615	3,615	2,281	3,615
Control Group Mean	0.79	5.29	2,276	28,605	0.63	3.46	2,251	18,754

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the Price and No Price treatment groups on rice purchases by eligibility status, conditional on public information. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, interactions of the two treatments with public information, strata fixed effects, and survey sample dummies. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. For each household, the variables for amount purchased, price and subsidy are averages over the past four months; the current month is dropped if the interview occurred before the 25th day of the month (as the Raskin rice is distributed after that day). The amount and subsidy are set equal to zero if the household does not purchase any Raskin rice, whereas the price is calculated among purchasing households. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 18: Effect of Printing Price on Cards on Minimum and Maximum Prices in the Village

	All Households			Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Average Price (Rp.) (1)	Min Price (Rp.) (2)	Max Price (Rp.) (3)	Average Price (Rp.) (4)	Min Price (Rp.) (5)	Max Price (Rp.) (6)	Average Price (Rp.) (7)	Min Price (Rp.) (8)	Max Price (Rp.) (9)
Cards with Printed Price	-58** (24)	-44* (24)	-117** (48)	-57** (24)	-8 (25)	-123*** (43)	-64** (31)	-68** (29)	-72* (39)
Cards without Printed Price	-10 (22)	-15 (26)	29 (48)	-20 (23)	12 (26)	-66 (43)	-19 (27)	-27 (26)	-14 (36)
<i>Difference:</i>									
Price – No Price	-48* (26)	-30 (27)	-146*** (54)	-37 (27)	-20 (28)	-57 (49)	-46 (30)	-41 (29)	-59 (41)
Observations	1,096	1,096	1,096	1,073	1,073	1,073	922	922	922
Control Group Mean	2,263	2,055	2,581	2,261	2,082	2,514	2,260	2,160	2,374

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the Price and No Price treatment groups on average, minimum, and maximum prices in the village, as compared to the control group. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments and strata fixed effects. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. The average price is calculated as the average price in the village separately for each survey wave, using only information from households that actually purchased Raskin (where price is observed). Columns 1-3 examine village average, minimum, and maximum price calculated over all surveyed households; Columns 4-6 calculate over only eligible households; and Columns 7-9 calculate over only ineligible households. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 19: Effect of Distributing Cards Only to the Bottom 10 Percent on Card Receipt and Use

	Bottom 10 Households			Other Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Knows Own Status (3)	Received Card (4)	Used Card (5)	Knows Own Status (6)	Received Card (7)	Used Card (8)	Knows Own Status (9)
Card to Bottom 10	0.25*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)
Cards to All	0.26*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
<i>Difference:</i>									
Bottom 10 – All	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.00 (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.02)	-0.13*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Observations	3,683	3,683	3,683	2,968	2,968	2,966	3,619	3,619	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.07	0.06	0.31	0.06	0.05	0.28	0.05	0.04	0.37

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the Bottom Ten and All Cards treatment groups on card outcomes and knowledge, by eligibility status, as compared to the control group. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, strata fixed effects, survey sample dummies, and a dummy for whether the village was also in the public information treatment. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 20: Effect of Only Distributing Cards to the Bottom 10 Percent on Protests and Complaints

	Indicator for whether village leaders reports any...				
	“Protests” (1)	“Complaints” by those who receive rice (2)	“Complaints” by those who do not receive rice (3)	“Complaints” about list of beneficiaries (4)	“Complaints” about distribution process (5)
Cards to Bottom 10	0.04* (0.02)	-0.08** (0.04)	0.04 (0.03)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.07** (0.04)
Cards to All	0.09*** (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.04)	0.11*** (0.03)	0.10*** (0.03)	-0.05 (0.04)
<i>Difference:</i>					
Bottom 10 – All	-0.05* (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.07** (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.02 (0.03)
Observations	1,143	1,144	1,144	1,144	1,144
Control Group Mean	0.11	0.43	0.22	0.18	0.41

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the Bottom Ten and All Cards treatment groups on village leaders’ reports of protests or complaints related to the Raskin program in the 12 months preceding the survey. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the treatment, strata fixed effects, and survey wave indicator. Data are pooled from village leader module of the first and second follow-up surveys. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 21: Effect of Distributing Cards with Coupons on Card Receipt and Use

	Eligible Households			Ineligible Households		
	Received Card (1)	Used Card (2)	Used Coupon (3)	Received Card (4)	Used Card (5)	Used Coupon (6)
Cards with Coupons	0.26*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)
Cards without Coupons	0.25*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
<i>Difference:</i>						
Coupons – No Coupons	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01* (0.01)
Observations	5,693	5,693	5,693	3,619	3,619	3,619
Control Group Mean	0.07	0.06	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.01

Note: This table provides the reduced form effect of belonging to the Coupons and No Coupons treatment groups on card outcomes and knowledge, by eligibility status, as compared to the control group. Each column in this table comes from a separate OLS regression of respective outcome on the two treatments, strata fixed effects, survey sample dummies, and a dummy for whether the village was also in the public information treatment. We also provide the difference in the two card treatments. Data are pooled from the first and second follow-up survey. Eligible households that did not receive a card under the bottom ten treatment are dropped from the sample and we re-weight the treatment groups by sub-district so that the ratio of all three income groups is the same. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Figure 1: Public Information Poster



Note: This is an example of the poster used in the public information treatment to inform citizens about the arrival of Raskin cards, as well as how to use them. On the bottom left of the poster is a copy of the card. The picture shows a household showing their Raskin card to an official and purchasing a bag of Raskin (in official packaging). This poster was used in villages assigned to the following combination of subtreatments: cards distributed to all eligible households, price, and no coupons. There were eight variants of the poster to reflect the various combinations of the subtreatments: with and without price, with and without coupons, and distributed to all eligible households or only to the bottom 10 percent. The top of the poster can be translated as follows: “Do you want to buy Raskin? Use your Raskin card!” The bottom right of the poster says: “1. Households eligible to purchase Raskin can be found on the official listing (DPM); 2. Households on the official listing will receive Raskin cards; 3. Raskin cards must be used when purchasing Raskin.”