

**Online Appendix for "Contracting out the Last-Mile of Service Delivery"
August 2016**

Appendix Table 1: Baseline Summary Statistic

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A: Distributor Characteristics</i>			
Raskin Distributor is Local/District Official	572	0.93	0.25
<i>Panel B: Baseline Raskin Purchase, from Household Surveys, All Households</i>			
Raskin Price Markup	5,332	657.62	472.48
Proportion that Purchased Raskin	6,860	0.73	0.44
Quantity Purchased	6,860	5.23	4.96
<i>Panel C: Baseline Raskin Purchase, from Household Surveys, Eligible Households</i>			
Raskin Price Markup	3,939	651.68	474.30
Proportion that Purchased Raskin	4,621	0.81	0.40
Quantity Purchased	4,621	6.04	5.06

Note: This table provides baseline summary statistics on the Raskin program. Price, quantity, and subsidy data come from the household survey. Distributor characteristics come from a survey of the locality head.

Appendix Table 2: Number of Localities Randomly Assigned to Each Treatment

Pure Control	285		
Bidding	191	Enhanced competition	96
		No enhanced competition	95
Information Only	96		

Appendix Table 3A: Who Distributes Raskin Six Months After Intervention, by Women Quota Subtreatment

<i>Panel A: Distributor Identity and Connections</i>						
	In charge of any responsibilities before May 2013	Distributor/spouse is/was local official	Distributor/spouse is related to a local official	Distributor/spouse is/was or is related to hamlet official	Is a trader	Lives in locality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Info or Bidding</i>						
No Women Quota	-0.040 (0.064)	-0.132** (0.066)	0.110* (0.059)	0.050 (0.072)	-0.018 (0.035)	-0.033 (0.056)
Women Quota	-0.030 (0.064)	0.015 (0.066)	-0.025 (0.059)	-0.049 (0.072)	0.035 (0.035)	-0.020 (0.056)
<i>Bidding</i>						
No Women Quota	-0.157** (0.072)	0.044 (0.075)	-0.027 (0.067)	-0.021 (0.082)	0.132*** (0.040)	-0.025 (0.064)
Women Quota	-0.173** (0.073)	-0.197*** (0.076)	0.119* (0.067)	0.016 (0.082)	0.010 (0.040)	-0.013 (0.064)
<i>P-Value</i>						
Info or Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.904	0.092	0.081	0.297	0.256	0.862
Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.877	0.024	0.126	0.749	0.032	0.892
Control Mean	0.803	0.347	0.160	0.350	0.034	0.816
<i>Panel B: Other Distributor Characteristics</i>						
	Owns a truck and/or a boat	Avg Digit Span above median	Raw dice score above median	Years of education	Has personal savings account for business	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
<i>Info or Bidding</i>						
No Women Quota	-0.067* (0.035)	-0.005 (0.078)	-0.003 (0.078)	0.023 (0.431)	0.026 (0.073)	
Women Quota	-0.010 (0.035)	-0.013 (0.078)	-0.040 (0.078)	0.445 (0.433)	0.047 (0.073)	
<i>Bidding</i>						
No Women Quota	0.063 (0.040)	0.036 (0.088)	0.007 (0.089)	-0.270 (0.490)	0.125 (0.083)	
Women Quota	-0.019 (0.040)	-0.032 (0.088)	0.039 (0.088)	-0.637 (0.491)	0.084 (0.083)	
<i>P-Value</i>						
Info or Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.220	0.940	0.718	0.457	0.830	
Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.142	0.587	0.803	0.598	0.722	
Control Mean	0.071	0.449	0.519	12.139	0.313	

Note: This table replicates Tables 2A (Panel A) and 2B (Panel B), but disaggregates bidding and information treatments by women quota subtreatment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 3B: Raskin Distribution Process, by Women Quota Subtreatment

	Bought Raskin (1)	Price markup (2)	Amount purchased (3)	Satisfied with rice quality (4)	Distance to purchase point (meters) (5)	Time to purchase point (minutes) (6)	HH paid for rice in advance (7)	Satisfied with Raskin program (8)
<i>Info or Bidding</i>								
No Women Quota	0.029 (0.03)	48 (34.63)	0.701** (0.32)	0.006 (0.01)	-10.893 (15.13)	0.682* (0.35)	0.002 (0.03)	-0.011 (0.01)
Women Quota	-0.047 (0.03)	-13 (28.64)	-0.403 (0.26)	0.006 (0.01)	9.003 (22.45)	0.193 (0.37)	0.024 (0.03)	-0.029** (0.01)
<i>Bidding</i>								
No Women Quota	-0.027 (0.04)	-75* (38.84)	-0.362 (0.37)	0.024 (0.02)	17.642 (18.24)	-0.838** (0.39)	0.005 (0.04)	-0.007 (0.02)
Women Quota	0.068* (0.04)	-20 (31.39)	0.363 (0.29)	0.014 (0.02)	-2.369 (24.49)	-0.159 (0.40)	-0.023 (0.03)	0.018 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Info or Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.06	0.15	0.00	0.97	0.43	0.31	0.62	0.32
Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.06	0.28	0.13	0.65	0.52	0.22	0.58	0.25
Observations	6,860	5,886	6,858	6,533	6,194	6,247	6,394	6,782
Control Mean	0.76	652.39	5.76	0.51	190.96	5.94	0.43	0.59

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but disaggregates bidding and information treatments by women quota subtreatment. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 4A: Who Distributes Raskin Six Months After Intervention, by Enhanced Supervision Subtreatment

<i>Panel A: Distributor Identity and Connections</i>						
	In charge of any responsibilities before May 2013	Distributor/spouse is/was local official	Distributor/ spouse is related to a local official	Distributor/spouse is/was or is related to hamlet official	Is a trader	Lives in locality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Info or Bidding</i>						
No Enhanced Supervision	-0.034 (0.064)	-0.120* (0.067)	0.018 (0.059)	0.017 (0.072)	-0.031 (0.035)	-0.057 (0.056)
Enhanced Supervision	-0.035 (0.064)	0.001 (0.066)	0.067 (0.059)	-0.015 (0.072)	0.047 (0.035)	0.003 (0.056)
<i>Bidding</i>						
No Enhanced Supervision	-0.164** (0.073)	-0.038 (0.076)	0.073 (0.067)	-0.000 (0.082)	0.107*** (0.040)	0.012 (0.064)
Enhanced Supervision	-0.166** (0.072)	-0.115 (0.075)	0.019 (0.067)	-0.004 (0.082)	0.035 (0.040)	-0.050 (0.063)
<i>P-Value</i>						
Info or Bidding: No Enhanced = Enhanced	0.987	0.167	0.531	0.733	0.093	0.415
Bidding: No Enhanced = Enhanced	0.985	0.474	0.569	0.978	0.209	0.493
Control Mean	0.803	0.347	0.160	0.350	0.034	0.816
<i>Panel B: Other Distributor Characteristics</i>						
	Owens a truck and/or a boat	Avg Digit Span above median	Raw dice score above median	Years of education	Has personal savings account for business	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
<i>Info or Bidding</i>						
No Enhanced Supervision	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.003 (0.078)	-0.007 (0.078)	0.104 (0.432)	0.064 (0.073)	
Enhanced Supervision	-0.025 (0.035)	-0.014 (0.078)	-0.035 (0.078)	0.362 (0.432)	0.008 (0.073)	
<i>Bidding</i>						
No Enhanced Supervision	0.040 (0.040)	0.070 (0.088)	0.026 (0.089)	-0.357 (0.492)	0.024 (0.083)	
Enhanced Supervision	0.005 (0.039)	-0.064 (0.088)	0.021 (0.088)	-0.549 (0.488)	0.183** (0.082)	
<i>P-Value</i>						
Info or Bidding: No Enhanced = Enhanced	0.565	0.913	0.784	0.649	0.556	
Bidding: No Enhanced = Enhanced	0.532	0.285	0.974	0.783	0.177	
Control Mean	0.071	0.449	0.519	12.139	0.313	

Note: This table replicates Tables 2A (Panel A) and 2B (Panel B), but disaggregates bidding and information treatments enhanced supervision subtreatment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 4B: Raskin Distribution Process, by Enhanced Supervision Subtreatment

	Bought Raskin	Price markup	Amount purchased	Satisfied with rice quality	Distance to purchase point (meters)	Time to purchase point (minutes)	HH paid for rice in advance	Satisfied with Raskin program
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Info or Bidding</i>								
No Enhanced Supervision	0.026 (0.03)	82*** (31.86)	0.269 (0.34)	0.007 (0.01)	6.913 (17.60)	0.899** (0.40)	0.040 (0.03)	-0.008 (0.01)
Enhanced Supervision	-0.044 (0.03)	-45 (29.21)	0.035 (0.26)	0.005 (0.02)	-8.599 (20.45)	-0.015 (0.30)	-0.015 (0.03)	-0.032** (0.01)
<i>Bidding</i>								
No Enhanced Supervision	0.015 (0.03)	-114*** (34.44)	0.113 (0.38)	0.019 (0.02)	25.478 (20.02)	-0.951** (0.43)	-0.048 (0.04)	-0.008 (0.02)
Enhanced Supervision	0.026 (0.04)	16 (33.13)	-0.118 (0.30)	0.019 (0.02)	-10.087 (22.23)	-0.049 (0.35)	0.030 (0.04)	0.020 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Info or Bidding: Not Enhanced = Enhanced	0.08	0.00	0.56	0.90	0.54	0.05	0.20	0.19
Bidding: Not Enhanced = Enhanced	0.84	0.01	0.63	0.99	0.23	0.10	0.13	0.19
Observations	6,860	5,886	6,858	6,533	6,194	6,247	6,394	6,782
Control Mean	0.76	652.39	5.76	0.51	190.96	5.94	0.43	0.59

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but disaggregates bidding and information treatments by enhanced supervision subtreatment. Standard errors are clustered by locality. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 5A: Randomization Checks for Bidding and Information Treatments

	Difference Between Treatment and Control, with Stratum						
	Means			FE			Bidding versus Information
	N	Control	Bidding	Information	Bidding versus Control	Information versus Control	
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	
Log per capita consumption	6859	13.06	13.04	13.05	-0.02 (.02)	-0.01 (.02)	-0.01 (.02)
Household head years of education	6787	6.11	6.16	5.97	.08 (.13)	-.14 (.16)	.22 (.17)
Bought Raskin in last 2 months	6860	.72	.73	.77	.01 (.02)	.05* (.02)	-.04 (.03)
Raskin price markup (Rp/kg)	5332	650.85	654.47	683.13	-16.82 (22.79)	20.12 (29.94)	-36.94 (31.09)
Amount of Raskin purchased per month (kg)	6860	5.27	5.06	5.45	-.24 (.23)	.12 (.26)	-.36 (.28)
Subsidy received (Rp./month)	6860	28141.77	26948.15	28952.66	-1375.06 (1256.69)	450.69 (1439.08)	-1825.75 (1519.1)
Overall satisfaction according to household, scaled 0-1	6732	0.57	0.57	0.57	0 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
Exclusion error	4621	.2	.2	.16	-.01 (.02)	-.04* (.02)	.03 (.03)
Inclusion error	2239	0.57	.58	.62	.01 (.03)	.06 (.04)	-.04 (.04)
Locality distance to subdistrict	572	7.52	5.86	7.72	-2.1 (1.36)	.45 (1.91)	-2.55 (1.93)
Percentage of agriculture households in RT	572	.07	.07	.06	-.01 (.01)	-.01* (.01)	.01 (.01)
Log locality size	572	6.97	6.91	7	-.04 (.05)	.04 (.07)	-.08 (.07)
Locality head years of education	572	13.39	13.31	13.61	-.04 (.18)	.23 (.21)	-.27 (.23)
Local government official is part of Raskin distribution committ	572	0.68	.71	.63	.03 (.04)	-.06 (.06)	.08 (.06)
Hamlet government official is part of Raskin distribution committ	572	.78	.8	0.68	.02 (.04)	-.09* (.05)	.12** (.05)
Joint P-Value					0.27	0.5	0.2

Note: This table provides a check on the randomization across the bidding, information and control groups. The data come from the baseline surveys. Locality distance to subdistrict and percentage of agricultural households in RT come from Targeting 2 survey (an previous round of surveys). Columns 2, 3, and 4 provide means for each variable for the control, bidding and information groups, respectively. We provide the difference in means with strata fixed effects in Columns 5 and 6. Joint significance p-value comes from randomization inference with 1000 re-randomization iterations. Standard errors clustered by locality in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 5B: Randomization Checks for Minimum Number of Bids Requirement

	N (1)	Means		Difference Between Enhanced Comp. and Open Bidding, with Stratum FE (4)
		Regular Bids (2)	Enhanced Comp (3)	
Log per capita consumption	2292	13.05	13.04	-.02 (.02)
Household head years of education	2268	6.13	6.19	.1 (.18)
Bought Raskin in last 2 months	2292	.73	.73	.01 (.03)
Raskin price markup (Rp/kg)	1779	674.97	634.35	-31.83 (31.48)
Amount of Raskin purchased per month (kg)	2292	5.04	5.08	-.09 (.33)
Subsidy received (Rp./month)	2292	26866.03	27029.42	-621.87 (1779.63)
Overall satisfaction according to household, scaled 0-1	2243	.58	0.57	0 (.01)
Exclusion error	1535	.19	.2	.01 (.03)
Inclusion error	757	0.57	.6	.04 (.05)
Locality distance to subdistrict	191	6.51	5.21	-1.6 (1.45)
Percentage of agriculture households in RT	191	.07	.07	0 (.01)
Log locality size	191	6.91	6.91	.02 (.08)
Locality head years of education	191	13.45	13.18	-.21 (.28)
Local government official is part of Raskin distribution committee	191	.72	.71	0 (.07)
Hamlet government official is part of Raskin distribution committee	191	.77	0.82	.04 (.06)
Joint P-Value				0.68

Note: This table provides a check on the randomization across the minimum required bid and regular bidding treatments. The data come from the baseline surveys. Locality distance to subdistrict and percentage of agricultural households in RT come from Targeting 2 survey (an previous round of surveys). Columns 2 and 3 provide means for each variable, by subtreatment. We provide the difference in means with strata fixed effects in Column 4. Joint significance p-value comes from randomization inference with 1000 re-randomization iterations. Standard errors clustered by locality in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 6: Raskin Distribution Process, Excluding Baseline Contr

	Bought Raskin	Price markup	Amount purchased	Satisfied with rice quality	Distance to purchase point (meters)	Time to purchase point (minutes)	HH paid for rice in advance	Satisfied with Raskin program
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Combined Effect of Outsourcing</i>								
Info or Bidding	0.008 (0.03)	23.090 (29.38)	0.203 (0.27)	0.006 (0.01)	16.143 (20.72)	0.582* (0.30)	-0.001 (0.04)	-0.021* (0.01)
Bidding	0.007 (0.03)	-56.772* (30.43)	-0.159 (0.28)	0.019* (0.01)	-1.946 (21.95)	-0.537* (0.31)	-0.008 (0.04)	0.007 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Bidding = Ctl	0.45	0.13	0.83	0.00	0.35	0.84	0.75	0.08
Observations	6,860	5,886	6,858	6,533	6,240	6,267	6,394	6,782
Control Mean	0.76	652.39	5.76	0.51	193.05	5.96	0.43	0.59
<i>Panel B: Estimating Additional Effect of Competition</i>								
Info or Bidding	0.008 (0.03)	23.148 (29.36)	0.203 (0.27)	0.006 (0.01)	16.190 (20.73)	0.582* (0.30)	-0.001 (0.04)	-0.021* (0.01)
Regular Bids	-0.001 (0.03)	-24.687 (36.39)	-0.171 (0.33)	0.016 (0.01)	24.185 (26.86)	-0.484 (0.37)	0.019 (0.04)	0.003 (0.01)
Enhanced Comp.	0.015 (0.03)	-87.674*** (32.66)	-0.146 (0.31)	0.022 (0.01)	-27.509 (22.85)	-0.588* (0.35)	-0.035 (0.04)	0.012 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Regular = Enh	0.62	0.06	0.94	0.66	0.03	0.76	0.21	0.43
Regular = Ctl	0.77	0.96	0.91	0.05	0.06	0.74	0.59	0.08
Enh. = Ctl	0.37	0.01	0.82	0.01	0.49	0.98	0.33	0.31
Observations	6,860	5,886	6,858	6,533	6,240	6,267	6,394	6,782
Control Mean	0.76	652.39	5.76	0.51	193.05	5.96	0.43	0.59

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but excludes baseline controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 7A: Raskin Distribution Process, Eligible Households On

	Bought Raskin	Price markup	Amount purchased	Satisfied with rice quality	Distance to purchase point (meters)	Time to purchase point (minutes)	HH paid for rice in advance	Satisfied with Raskin program
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Combined Effect of Outsourcing</i>								
Info or Bidding	-0.005 (0.02)	19.935 (23.27)	0.095 (0.27)	0.010 (0.01)	-11.826 (16.50)	0.382 (0.30)	0.001 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.01)
Bidding	0.012 (0.03)	-52.867** (23.86)	0.080 (0.29)	0.018 (0.01)	17.804 (17.35)	-0.449 (0.31)	-0.001 (0.03)	0.003 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Bidding = Ctl	0.74	0.06	0.42	0.00	0.62	0.76	0.99	0.11
Observations	4,621	4,327	4,619	4,565	4,391	4,434	4,549	4,609
Control Mean	0.84	642.03	6.61	0.51	196.22	6.17	0.44	0.60
<i>Panel B: Estimating Additional Effect of Competition</i>								
Info or Bidding	-0.005 (0.02)	20.024 (23.27)	0.096 (0.27)	0.010 (0.01)	-11.701 (16.51)	0.382 (0.30)	0.001 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.01)
Regular Bids	0.015 (0.03)	-28.663 (28.54)	0.206 (0.35)	0.018 (0.01)	38.555* (20.94)	-0.399 (0.38)	0.029 (0.03)	0.002 (0.01)
Enhanced Comp.	0.008 (0.03)	-76.828*** (25.76)	-0.047 (0.32)	0.018 (0.01)	-2.750 (18.36)	-0.499 (0.34)	-0.031 (0.03)	0.004 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Regular = Enh	0.84	0.07	0.46	0.97	0.03	0.77	0.05	0.90
Regular = Ctl	0.69	0.71	0.31	0.02	0.10	0.95	0.20	0.20
Enh. = Ctl	0.90	0.00	0.85	0.02	0.30	0.65	0.23	0.20
Observations	4,621	4,327	4,619	4,565	4,391	4,434	4,549	4,609
Control Mean	0.84	642.03	6.61	0.51	196.22	6.17	0.44	0.60

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but includes only households officially eligible for Raskin. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 7B: Raskin Distribution Process, Ineligible Households On

	Bought Raskin	Price markup	Amount purchased	Satisfied with rice quality	Distance to purchase point (meters)	Time to purchase point (minutes)	HH paid for rice in advance	Satisfied with Raskin program
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Panel A: Combined Effect of Outsourcing</i>								
Info or Bidding	-0.011 (0.03)	16.707 (36.61)	0.289 (0.27)	-0.002 (0.01)	24.742 (19.05)	0.611* (0.35)	0.043 (0.03)	-0.024 (0.01)
Bidding	0.035 (0.03)	-36.949 (38.57)	-0.190 (0.29)	0.022 (0.02)	-14.818 (19.47)	-0.647* (0.36)	-0.029 (0.03)	0.010 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Bidding = Ctl	0.33	0.42	0.62	0.09	0.49	0.89	0.55	0.21
Observations	2,239	1,559	2,239	1,968	1,803	1,813	1,845	2,173
Control Mean	0.60	681.37	4.01	0.50	178.02	5.37	0.39	0.56
<i>Panel B: Estimating Additional Effect of Competition</i>								
Info or Bidding	-0.011 (0.03)	16.604 (36.58)	0.289 (0.27)	-0.002 (0.01)	24.756 (19.05)	0.611* (0.35)	0.043 (0.03)	-0.024 (0.01)
Regular Bids	0.012 (0.04)	-11.879 (47.15)	-0.482 (0.32)	0.012 (0.02)	-6.228 (22.41)	-0.524 (0.40)	-0.038 (0.04)	-0.004 (0.02)
Enhanced Comp.	0.059 (0.04)	-59.325 (40.00)	0.101 (0.34)	0.031* (0.02)	-22.852 (22.00)	-0.763* (0.41)	-0.021 (0.03)	0.023 (0.02)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Regular = Enh	0.25	0.24	0.06	0.32	0.44	0.52	0.60	0.07
Regular = Ctl	0.97	0.90	0.43	0.51	0.30	0.77	0.88	0.04
Enh. = Ctl	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.06	0.92	0.64	0.43	0.99
Observations	2,239	1,559	2,239	1,968	1,803	1,813	1,845	2,173
Control Mean	0.60	681.37	4.01	0.50	178.02	5.37	0.39	0.56

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but includes only households officially ineligible for Raskin. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 8A: Who was Selected in Bidding Localities (OLS)

	1-by-1 (1)	Joint (Form) (2)	Joint (All) (3)
<i>Panel A: Proposal Characteristics</i>			
Price markup (Rp/kg) promised by bidder	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Pay before receipt	-0.195 (0.203)	-0.240 (0.251)	-0.530 (0.542)
Offers credit	0.210 (0.205)	0.265 (0.166)	0.262 (0.339)
Lives in distribution locality	-0.387 (0.264)	-0.277 (0.319)	-0.257 (0.559)
Is Raskin distributor at time of bidding	0.175 (0.115)	0.072 (0.111)	0.117 (0.174)
Is a trader	0.371* (0.188)	0.468*** (0.153)	0.525** (0.239)
Has means of transportation supportive of Raskin distribution	0.373*** (0.115)	0.250** (0.119)	0.261 (0.241)
<i>Panel B: Individual Characteristics</i>			
Bidder/spouse is related to a local official	0.101 (0.197)		-0.023 (0.169)
Bidder/spouse is/was local official	0.200 (0.262)		-0.006 (0.277)
Raw dice score above median	0.088 (0.170)		0.018 (0.140)
Years of education	0.040* (0.024)		0.004 (0.025)
Has personal savings account that be used for business	0.365* (0.191)		0.215 (0.202)
Joint P-Value		0.000	0.000

Note: This table replicates Table 6A, but estimates the coefficients by OLS rather than the conditional logit. Standard errors are clustered by locality.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 8B: Who was Selected in Bidding Localities, by Enhanced Comp.? (OLS)

	1-by-1 (1)	Joint (Form) (2)	Joint (All) (3)
<i>Panel A: Proposal Characteristics</i>			
Enhanced Comp. * Promised price markup	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Enhanced Comp. * Pay before receipt	-0.379 (0.534)	-0.823* (0.472)	-1.423** (0.686)
Enhanced Comp. * Offers credit	-0.494 (0.358)	-0.281 (0.323)	-0.802 (0.616)
Enhanced Comp. * Lives in locality	0.676** (0.277)	1.350*** (0.431)	1.506** (0.740)
Enhanced Comp. * Distributor at time of bidding	0.260 (0.230)	0.170 (0.234)	-0.049 (0.369)
Enhanced Comp. * Trader	0.268 (0.417)	0.355 (0.346)	0.508 (0.503)
Enhanced Comp. * Has means of transportation supportive of Raskin	0.477** (0.227)	0.328 (0.250)	0.469 (0.465)
<i>Panel B: Individual Characteristics</i>			
Enhanced Comp. * Bidder/spouse is related to a local official	0.325 (0.393)		0.140 (0.369)
Enhanced Comp. * Bidder/spouse is/was local official	0.602 (0.494)		0.455 (0.602)
Enhanced Comp. * Raw dice score above median	-0.109 (0.341)		-0.165 (0.295)
Enhanced Comp. * Years of education	0.023 (0.050)		0.038 (0.055)
Enhanced Comp. * Has personal savings account	0.127 (0.381)		-0.010 (0.401)
Joint P-Value		0.008	0.135

Note: This table replicates Table 6B, but estimates the coefficients by OLS rather than the conditional logit. Standard errors are clustered by locality.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 9: Corruption on Locality Price Markup, Without Locality Controls

	Baseline Raskin Markup		Endline Raskin Markup		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Raskin Distributor's Dice Score Above Median	48.681 (35.017)		82.142** (47.809)		
Perception of Locality Head's Corruption		597.962*** (132.836)		691.080*** (184.110)	
Perception of Raskin Distributor's Corruption					549.347** (220.105)
Observations	454	455	278	279	269

Note: This table replicates Table 8, but excludes baseline locality controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 10: When Did Original Distributor Win and Continue Distributing? (Unconditional)

	Where Was No Bidding Meeting Held, or Meeting Had No Bids?				Where Did Original Distributor Win?				Where is Original Distributor Still Distributing?			
	Joint (Household		Joint (Form		Joint (Household		Joint (Form		Joint (Household		Joint (Form	
	1-by-1	Only)	Only)	Joint (All)	1-by-1	Only)	Only)	Joint (All)	1-by-1	Only)	Only)	Joint (All)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A: Reported by Households in Baseline</i>												
Avg Price Markup (Rp/kg)	-0.00299*** (0.00089)	-0.00291** (0.00115)		-0.00337*** (0.00122)	-0.00154*** (0.00054)	-0.00148** (0.00063)		-0.00199** (0.00097)	-0.00088** (0.00044)	-0.00074 (0.00049)		-0.00093 (0.00069)
HH Bought Raskin in Last 2 Months	0.37 (0.89)	0.52 (1.24)		0.29 (1.46)	1.47** (0.60)	1.03 (0.73)		0.64 (0.93)	0.22 (0.59)	0.55 (0.69)		0.74 (0.87)
Avg Amount of Raskin Purchased (kg)	0.0240 (0.068)	-0.0429 (0.091)		-0.0615 (0.120)	0.0618 (0.070)	0.0025 (0.060)		0.0298 (0.063)	-0.0304 (0.053)	-0.0300 (0.057)		-0.0588 (0.063)
Avg Satisfaction with Program Quality (0-1 scale)	3.89* (2.24)	1.41 (2.99)		0.77 (3.37)	4.52*** (1.68)	3.91** (1.83)		5.57** (2.23)	-0.010 (1.55)	-1.25 (1.58)		-1.05 (1.86)
Avg Distance to Purchase Point (meters)	0.00078 (0.0013)	-0.00070 (0.00147)		-0.00030 (0.00156)	-0.00121 (0.00087)	-0.00200* (0.00109)		-0.00223* (0.00127)	0.00013 (0.00086)	0.00010 (0.00096)		0.00019 (0.00111)
HH purchased Raskin in advance	1.47*** (0.49)	1.10** (0.53)		1.20** (0.61)	1.07*** (0.36)	0.45 (0.42)		0.19 (0.50)	0.44 (0.35)	0.35 (0.40)		0.51 (0.46)
<i>Panel B: From Facilitation Forms</i>												
Raw dice score above median	0.81* (0.46)		0.95** (0.48)	1.01** (0.49)	1.08*** (0.35)		1.13*** (0.36)	1.06** (0.41)	0.65* (0.33)		0.64* (0.35)	0.65* (0.38)
Old Distributor Provides Credit if Recipient Cannot Afford Raskin	-0.69 (0.65)		-0.59 (0.73)	0.36 (0.80)	-0.37 (0.37)		-0.24 (0.53)	0.28 (0.62)	-0.29 (0.37)		-0.60 (0.46)	-0.51 (0.48)
Costs of Rental Vehicle and/or Fuel to Old Distributor	-0.00620 (0.00874)		-0.00655 (0.00810)	-0.01197* (0.00705)	-0.00016 (0.00327)		-0.00370 (0.00399)	-0.00121 (0.00428)	0.00185 (0.00320)		0.00199 (0.00393)	0.00401 (0.00447)
Non-Transportation Costs to Old Distributor	-0.00031 (0.00174)		0.00039 (0.00141)	0.00253 (0.00157)	-0.00113 (0.00101)		-0.00054 (0.00108)	0.00041 (0.00115)	-0.00105 (0.00106)		-0.00027 (0.00116)	0.00041 (0.00118)
Joint P-Value		0.004	0.294	0.006		0.002	0.036	0.013		0.438	0.320	0.452
Observations		187	149	147		187	149	147		185	148	146
Mean		0.13	0.17	0.17		0.59	0.63	0.63		0.57	0.58	0.58

Note: This table replicates Table 9, but Columns 5-12 include the same sample of localities as Columns 1-4 (i.e. "Where Did Old Distributor Win?" is not conditional on holding a bidding meeting with 1+ bid, and "Where is Old Distributor Still Distributing" is not conditional on old distributor losing bidding). *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Appendix Table 11: When Did Original Distributor Win and Continue Distributing? (OLS)

	Where Was No Bidding Meeting Held, or Meeting Had No Bids?				Where Did Original Distributor Win? (Conditional on Bidding Held with 1+ Bid)				Where is Original Distributor Still Distributing? (Conditional on Not Winning)			
	Joint				Joint				Joint			
	1-by-1	(Household Only)	Joint (Form Only)	Joint (All)	1-by-1	(Household Only)	Joint (Form Only)	Joint (All)	1-by-1	(Household Only)	Joint (Form Only)	Joint (All)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A: Reported by Households in Baseline</i>												
Avg Price Markup (Rp/kg)	-0.00027*** (0.00007)	-0.00021*** (0.00008)		-0.00028*** (0.00011)	-0.00027** (0.00013)	-0.00024* (0.00014)		-0.00027 (0.00018)	0.00004 (0.00017)	-0.00002 (0.00020)		0.00016 (0.00031)
HH Bought Raskin in Last 2 Months	0.042 (0.097)	0.051 (0.095)		-0.004 (0.145)	0.383*** (0.143)	0.215 (0.167)		0.154 (0.219)	-0.046 (0.196)	0.067 (0.236)		0.241 (0.326)
Avg Amount of Raskin Purchased (kg)	0.0029 (0.0088)	-0.0011 (0.0082)		-0.0033 (0.0096)	0.0146 (0.0163)	-0.0013 (0.0130)		0.0032 (0.0120)	-0.0154 (0.0113)	-0.0108 (0.0112)		-0.0145 (0.0130)
Avg Satisfaction with Program Quality (0-1 scale)	0.454* (0.265)	0.239 (0.265)		0.246 (0.344)	0.978** (0.393)	0.905** (0.433)		1.268*** (0.470)	0.116 (0.506)	-0.040 (0.591)		0.074 (0.916)
Avg Distance to Purchase Point (meters)	0.00010 (0.00018)	0.00003 (0.00015)		0.00009 (0.00018)	-0.00044* (0.00023)	-0.00051** (0.00024)		-0.00062** (0.00026)	0.00037 (0.00030)	0.00040 (0.00032)		0.00023 (0.00036)
HH purchased Raskin in advance	0.167*** (0.057)	0.109* (0.060)		0.128* (0.070)	0.197** (0.090)	0.056 (0.098)		-0.018 (0.105)	-0.224* (0.117)	-0.194 (0.150)		-0.239 (0.229)
<i>Panel B: From Facilitation Forms</i>												
Raw dice score above median	0.110* (0.060)		0.131** (0.064)	0.128** (0.062)	0.238*** (0.087)		0.236** (0.091)	0.186** (0.092)	-0.048 (0.128)		-0.090 (0.136)	-0.115 (0.129)
Old Distributor Provides Credit if Recipient Cannot Afford	-0.068 (0.054)		-0.079 (0.086)	0.018 (0.087)	-0.064 (0.097)		-0.026 (0.131)	0.047 (0.137)	0.077 (0.131)		0.047 (0.189)	-0.107 (0.189)
Costs of Rental Vehicle and/or Fuel to Old Distributor	-0.00058 (0.00065)		-0.00085 (0.00084)	-0.00088 (0.00067)	0.00028 (0.00089)		-0.00054 (0.00110)	-0.00004 (0.00108)	-0.00053 (0.00150)		0.00074 (0.00172)	0.00075 (0.00187)
Non-Transportation Costs to Old Distributor	-0.00004 (0.00019)		0.00007 (0.00024)	0.00026 (0.00025)	-0.00033 (0.00029)		-0.00018 (0.00033)	-0.00001 (0.00030)	-0.00043 (0.00034)		0.00007 (0.00062)	-0.00011 (0.00070)
Joint P-Value		0.002	0.268	0.012		0.002	0.113	0.000		0.442	0.964	0.362
Observations		187	149	147		162	123	122		76	55	54
Mean		0.13	0.17	0.17		0.53	0.55	0.56		0.32	0.33	0.31

Note: This table replicates Table 9, but estimates the coefficients by OLS rather than the logit.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 12: When Did Original Distributor Win and Continue Distributing? With Baseline Controls

	Where Was No Bidding Meeting Held, or Meeting Had No Bids?				Where Did Original Distributor Win? (Conditional on Bidding Held with 1+ Bid)				Where is Original Distributor Still Distributing? (Conditional on Not Winning)			
	Joint				Joint				Joint			
	1-by-1 (1)	(Household Only) (2)	Joint (Form Only) (3)	Joint (All) (4)	1-by-1 (5)	(Household Only) (6)	Joint (Form Only) (7)	Joint (All) (8)	1-by-1 (9)	(Household Only) (10)	Joint (Form Only) (11)	Joint (All) (12)
	<i>Panel A: Reported by Households in Baseline</i>											
Avg Price Markup (Rp/kg)	-0.00336*** (0.00111)	-0.00308** (0.00138)	-0.00305** (0.00139)	-0.00142** (0.00060)	-0.00141** (0.00066)	-0.00176* (0.00092)	0.00031 (0.00084)	0.00001 (0.00099)	0.00203 (0.00161)			
HH Bought Raskin in Last 2 Months	0.234 (1.068)	0.974 (1.490)	1.105 (1.793)	1.601** (0.661)	1.138 (0.831)	1.117 (1.154)	0.030 (0.924)	0.489 (1.224)	2.800 (2.237)			
Avg Amount of Raskin Purchased (kg)	0.07536 (0.08219)	0.00143 (0.11415)	-0.00006 (0.15475)	0.08532 (0.07315)	0.01664 (0.06628)	0.05495 (0.07213)	-0.07359 (0.06319)	-0.06960 (0.08769)	-0.07413 (0.18843)			
Avg Satisfaction with Program Quality (0-1 scale)	5.193** (2.442)	1.777 (2.996)	1.390 (3.303)	4.388** (1.831)	3.494* (2.084)	5.075** (2.341)	0.814 (2.240)	0.388 (2.721)	-2.548 (6.384)			
Avg Distance to Purchase Point (meters)	0.00156 (0.00129)	-0.00010 (0.00152)	0.00052 (0.00177)	-0.00178* (0.00104)	-0.00249** (0.00126)	-0.00333** (0.00148)	0.00145 (0.00138)	0.00171 (0.00146)	0.00174 (0.00214)			
HH purchased Raskin in advance	1.580*** (0.553)	1.290** (0.624)	1.526** (0.684)	0.868** (0.391)	0.290 (0.441)	-0.094 (0.535)	-1.275** (0.647)	-1.190 (0.784)	-1.605 (1.658)			
	<i>Panel B: From Facilitation Forms</i>											
Raw dice score above median	0.990** (0.489)		1.121** (0.495)	1.407** (0.576)	1.084*** (0.382)	1.176*** (0.424)	1.082** (0.458)	0.020 (0.623)	-0.156 (0.716)	-0.071 (0.770)		
Old Distributor Provides Credit if Recipient Cannot Afford	-0.734 (0.616)		-0.681 (0.731)	-0.249 (0.870)	-0.270 (0.400)	-0.220 (0.580)	0.086 (0.652)	0.472 (0.576)	0.524 (1.010)	-0.753 (1.049)		
Costs of Rental Vehicle and/or Fuel to Old Distributor	-0.00599 (0.00775)		-0.00616 (0.00743)	-0.00970 (0.00659)	0.00024 (0.00386)	-0.00330 (0.00480)	-0.00008 (0.00485)	-0.00150 (0.00809)	-0.00002 (0.00906)	-0.00345 (0.00945)		
Non-Transportation Costs to Old Distributor	-0.00074 (0.00158)		-0.00017 (0.00138)	0.00131 (0.00150)	-0.00174 (0.00126)	-0.00104 (0.00137)	-0.00018 (0.00137)	-0.00172 (0.00203)	0.00009 (0.00287)	-0.00199 (0.00443)		
Joint P-Value		0.003	0.149	0.005		0.012	0.071	0.020	0.526	0.991	0.092	
Observations		187	149	147		162	123	122	76	55	54	
Mean		0.13	0.17	0.17		0.53	0.55	0.56	0.32	0.33	0.31	

Note: This table replicates Table 9, but controls for baseline characteristics: log locality population, number of hamlets in locality, and distance to subdistrict. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Appendix Table 13: When Did Original Distributor Win and Continue Distributing? With Baseline Controls, Unconditional

	Where Was No Bidding Meeting Held, or Meeting Had No Bids?				Where Did Original Distributor Win?				Where is Original Distributor Still Distributing?			
	Joint		Joint (Form Only)	Joint (All)	Joint		Joint (Form Only)	Joint (All)	Joint		Joint (Form Only)	Joint (All)
	1-by-1	(Household Only)			1-by-1	(Household Only)			1-by-1	(Household Only)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A: Reported by Households in Baseline</i>												
Avg Price Markup (Rp/kg)	-0.00336*** (0.00111)	-0.00308** (0.00138)		-0.00305** (0.00139)	-0.00176*** (0.00057)	-0.00169*** (0.00063)		-0.00207** (0.00087)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)		-0.000 (0.001)
HH Bought Raskin in Last 2 Months	0.234 (1.068)	0.974 (1.490)		1.105 (1.793)	1.427** (0.599)	1.159 (0.764)		1.005 (1.003)	0.113 (0.596)	0.508 (0.690)		0.849 (0.848)
Avg Amount of Raskin Purchased (kg)	0.07536 (0.08219)	0.00143 (0.11415)		-0.00006 (0.15475)	0.0922 (0.0710)	0.0303 (0.0650)		0.0710 (0.0706)	-0.023 (0.054)	-0.022 (0.060)		-0.014 (0.063)
Avg Satisfaction with Program Quality (0-1 scale)	5.193** (2.442)	1.777 (2.996)		1.390 (3.303)	4.912*** (1.744)	3.499* (1.966)		4.720** (2.229)	0.186 (1.560)	-1.121 (1.604)		-1.357 (1.882)
Avg Distance to Purchase Point (meters)	0.00156 (0.00129)	-0.00010 (0.00152)		0.00052 (0.00177)	-0.00105 (0.00090)	-0.0020* (0.0011)		-0.00228* (0.00130)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)
HH purchased Raskin in advance	1.580*** (0.553)	1.290** (0.624)		1.526** (0.684)	1.085*** (0.376)	0.517 (0.431)		0.269 (0.530)	0.353 (0.358)	0.343 (0.404)		0.623 (0.485)
<i>Panel B: From Facilitation Forms</i>												
Raw dice score above median	0.990** (0.489)		1.121** (0.495)	1.407** (0.576)	1.213*** (0.359)		1.359*** (0.406)	1.305*** (0.457)	0.770** (0.351)		0.767** (0.385)	0.845** (0.423)
Old Distributor Provides Credit if Recipient Cannot Afford	-0.734 (0.616)		-0.681 (0.731)	-0.249 (0.870)	-0.386 (0.386)		-0.364 (0.557)	0.100 (0.630)	-0.215 (0.369)		-0.556 (0.463)	-0.678 (0.494)
Costs of Rental Vehicle and/or Fuel to Old Distributor	-0.00599 (0.00775)		-0.00616 (0.00743)	-0.00970 (0.00659)	-0.0008 (0.0037)		-0.0047 (0.0044)	-0.0018 (0.0043)	0.00246 (0.00341)		0.00167 (0.00431)	0.00225 (0.00472)
Non-Transportation Costs to Old Distributor	-0.00074 (0.00158)		-0.00017 (0.00138)	0.00131 (0.00150)	-0.00158 (0.00103)		-0.00096 (0.00115)	-0.00003 (0.00128)	-0.00098 (0.00103)		-0.00033 (0.00120)	-0.00016 (0.00127)
Joint P-Value		0.003	0.149	0.005		0.001	0.016	0.004		0.760	0.244	0.682
Observations		187	149	147		187	149	147		185	148	146
Mean		0.13	0.17	0.17		0.59	0.63	0.63		0.57	0.58	0.58

Note: This table replicates Appendix Table 12, but Columns 5-12 include the same sample of localities as Columns 1-4 (i.e. "Where Did Old Distributor Win?" is not conditional on holding a bidding meeting with 1+ bid, and "Where is Old Distributor Still Distributing?" is not conditional on old distributor losing bidding). *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Appendix Table 14: Who Distributes Raskin, After Six Month Re-Evaluation

	New Distributor At Endline		New Distributor After Re-Evaluation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Info or Bidding	0.041 (0.049)	0.041 (0.049)	0.053 (0.049)	0.053 (0.049)
Bidding	0.160*** (0.052)		0.128** (0.052)	
Regular Bids		0.130** (0.059)		0.108* (0.060)
Enhanced Comp.		0.191*** (0.060)		0.148** (0.060)
Control Mean	0.193	0.193	0.193	0.193
Bidding=Ctl	0.000		0.000	
Regular=Min		0.309		0.501
Regular=Ctl		0.001		0.001
Min=Ctl		0.000		0.000

"New distributor at endline" is a binary variable that equals one if distributor at endline did not hold any pre-pilot distribution duties. "New distributor after re-evaluation" is a binary variable that equals one if distributor after the 6-month evaluation meeting did not hold any pre-pilot distribution duties. For control localities (as well as treatment localities that did not hold evaluation meetings), this is the same as "New distributor at endline." Regressions estimated by OLS with strata fixed effects. Original localities (i.e. if locality split in two, only keep original part) only. Each column has 571 observations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 15: Why is Winner Not Distributing at Endline in Bidding Localities?

	Number of Winners Reporting...
Ever Distributed?	
Never Distributed Raskin	25
Distributed Some, but No Longer Coordinator	13
Reason for No Longer Distributing	
Fell ill/died	1
Couldn't handle responsibility	10
Decided by others	11
If Blocked by Others, Whom?	
Local forum	1
Bidding committee	1
Local government	8
Subdistrict government	4
District government	1

Note: For the sample of winners who report not distributing at endline (38/185 winners selected), this table shows whether they distributed after bidding, and why they claim that they are not currently distributor. Winners could select multiple options.

Appendix Table 16: Price Gap in Bidding Localities

	Strata FE (1)	No FE (2)
<i>Panel A: Winner no longer distributing (38 localities)</i>		
Winner Cannot Handle Distribution	-42.677 (68.506)	-54.740 (48.990)
<i>Panel B: All localities with winner (185 localities)</i>		
Winner Cannot Handle Distribution	-157.307* (83.059)	-44.595 (60.251)

Note: This table shows relationship between reason for default and the difference between endline and baseline price in bidding localities. Panel A consists of localities where the winner is no longer distributing for any reason, while Panel B is the full sample of bidding localities that chose a winner. Column 1 includes strata fixed effects, while Column 2 does not. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 17: Bidding vs Info Meetings (Conditional on Meeting Occurring)

	Info		Bidding		Regular Bids		Enhanced Comp.		P-Value	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Bidding = Info	Open = Min
Length of Meeting (Hrs)	1.58	0.50	1.74	0.68	1.69	0.71	1.79	0.64	0.04**	0.34
Total Number of Meeting Attendees	28.54	14.78	21.69	9.13	21.09	10.31	22.31	7.75	0.00***	0.36
Number Raskin Beneficiaries Attending	12.42	13.96	8.28	8.32	8.78	8.95	7.77	7.63	0.00***	0.41
Number Local Officials Attending	12.35	5.94	9.42	5.83	8.80	5.95	10.06	5.66	0.00***	0.14
Any Questions/Comments Left at Meeting?	0.92	0.28	0.88	0.33	0.91	0.29	0.85	0.36	0.33	0.18
Number of Questions/Comments	6.59	5.10	4.36	2.06	4.15	1.77	4.60	2.32	0.00***	0.17

Notes: This table provides summary statistics on bidding and information meetings. All data come from the forms that the facilitators used to document these meetings. We present the sample statistics for the 96 localities where information-only meetings were held and then 184 localities where bidding meetings were held.

*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 18: Bid Markups

	Incumbent's Bid		Average Bid		Minimum Bid		Endline Price - Winning Bid	
	All Localities	>1 Bidder	All Localities	>1 Bidder	All Localities	>1 Bidder	All Localities	>1 Bidder
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Enhanced Comp.	10.435 (46.351)	3.360 (58.060)	20.664 (32.303)	11.940 (38.502)	-1.788 (32.012)	-0.996 (38.558)	-55.103 (41.190)	-81.285 (50.545)
Baseline Markup	0.563*** (0.074)	0.556*** (0.088)	0.591*** (0.054)	0.587*** (0.062)	0.566*** (0.053)	0.560*** (0.060)	0.169*** (0.053)	0.170*** (0.063)
Constant	88.649* (53.424)	108.682 (68.749)	84.695** (40.392)	115.171** (48.990)	57.352 (39.338)	60.637 (47.031)	93.074** (40.962)	112.365** (47.733)
Observations	146	110	165	115	165	115	118	77
R-squared	0.436	0.423	0.509	0.523	0.487	0.489	0.083	0.115


Note: This table compares bid markups between minimum bids and Regular Bids treatment localities. Columns 1-2 report results on bids from distribution incumbents (if they exist), Columns 3-4 report average bids, Columns 5-6 report minimum bid in a locality, and Columns 7-8 report the difference between endline price and winning bid in a locality (if winning bidder is distributor at endline). Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 include all localities with at least one bid, while Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 restrict to localities with multiple bids. Results from OLS with a dummy for missing baseline markup. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 19: Corruption on Locality Price Markup in Treatment Localities

	Baseline Raskin Markup		Endline Raskin Markup		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Raskin	60.317		47.196		
Distributor's	(44.415)		(41.183)		
Perception of		624.087***		645.854***	
Local Head's		(168.818)		(153.585)	
Perception of					337.917*
Raskin					(198.169)
Observations	229	230	281	283	277

Note: In this table, we explore the relationship between corruption and Raskin price markup. In each column, we regress average price markup reported by households in a locality on a measure of corruption, controlling for baseline locality characteristics (number of hamlets, log number of households, distance to subdistrict). Our measures of corruption, by column, are: 1. Dummy for baseline distributor's dice score above median; 2. Average perception of locality head's corruption at baseline; 3. Dummy for endline distributor's dice score above median; 4. Average perception of locality head's corruption at endline; 5. Average perception of Raskin distributor's corruption at endline. Measures of corruption consist of 4 categories, scaled 0-1, where 0 equals "no possibility of corruption" and 1 equals "very high possibility of corruption." Columns 1 and 2 examine baseline Raskin markup and include treatment localities; Columns 3, 4, and 5 examine endline Raskin price

Appendix Figure 1: Distribution of Baseline Raskin Price Markup




Note: This figure shows the distribution of Raskin price markup (i.e. reported price less Rp 1600, the official price of Raskin) reported by households at baseline. After dropping absurd values (price < Rp 500 or price > Rp 10,000), the top 1% of markup values reported have also been dropped.

Appendix Figure 2: Project Timeline

	2013										2014	
	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb
Treatment Implementation												
Re-Evaluation												
Baseline Survey												
Endline Survey												


Note: This figure provides a timeline of the implementation and survey activities.

Appendix Figure 3: Why were you selected (or not) as winning distributor?



Note: This figure shows the reasons reported by bidders for why they won (Panel A) or lost (Panel B) the bidding process. Respondents could select multiple reasons and/or report their own. Only the top 10 most frequent responses are shown. Data come from the endline distributor survey, which was given to (1) the current distributor, (2) the original distributor, (3) the bidding winner, and (4) one bidding loser (these sets may overlap such that the minimum number of people interviewed per locality is two).

Appendix Figure 4: Winning price markup, by baseline price markup



Note: This figure shows a scatterplot of baseline price markup in a locality (from baseline household survey) vs price markup promised by the winning bidder (from bidding meeting form). A 45 degree line is provided for reference; promised markup is higher than baseline for points above the line, and lower for points below the line.