

Appendix Table 1: Baseline Summary Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>Panel A: Distributor Characteristics</i>			
Raskin Distributor is Village/District Official	572	0.93	0.25
<i>Panel B: Baseline Raskin Purchase, from Household Surveys, All Households</i>			
Raskin Price Markup	5,332	657.62	472.48
Proportion that Purchased Raskin	6,860	0.73	0.44
Quantity Purchased	6,860	5.23	4.96
<i>Panel C: Baseline Raskin Purchase, from Household Surveys, Eligible Households</i>			
Raskin Price Markup	3,939	651.68	474.30
Proportion that Purchased Raskin	4,621	0.81	0.40
Quantity Purchased	4,621	6.04	5.06

Note: This table provides baseline summary statistics on the Raskin program. Price, quantity, and subsidy data come from the household survey. Distributor characteristics come from a survey of the village head.

Appendix Table 2: Number of Villages Randomly Assigned to Each Treatment

Pure Control	285		
Bidding	191	Min # of bids	96
		Open Bids	95
Information Only	96		

Appendix Table 3A: Who Distributes Raskin Six Months After Intervention? By Min Bids

	In charge of any responsibilities before May 2013	Distributor/ spouse is/was village official	Distributor/ spouse is related to a village official	Distributor/ spouse is/was or is related to subvillage official	Is a trader	Lives in village
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Info or Bidding	-0.035 (0.048)	-0.059 (0.050)	0.043 (0.045)	0.039 (0.055)	0.008 (0.027)	-0.027 (0.042)
Open Bids	-0.135** (0.059)	-0.110* (0.062)	0.053 (0.055)	0.068 (0.067)	0.068** (0.033)	-0.046 (0.052)
Min # Bids	-0.197*** (0.059)	-0.042 (0.062)	0.038 (0.055)	0.017 (0.068)	0.074** (0.033)	0.009 (0.052)
<i>P-Value</i>						
Open = Min	0.297	0.272	0.783	0.452	0.839	0.288
Open = Ctl	0.001	0.001	0.033	0.053	0.005	0.085
Min = Ctl	0.000	0.046	0.073	0.313	0.002	0.671
Control Mean	0.803	0.347	0.160	0.327	0.034	0.816

Note: This tables replicates Table 2A, but disaggregates the bidding effect by whether the village was randomized into the minimum number of bids requirement or whether it was left open. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 3B: Who Distributes Raskin Six Months After Intervention? By Min Bids

	Owens a truck and/or a boat	Avg Digit Span above median	Raw dice score above median	Years of education	Has personal savings account for business
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Info or Bidding	-0.039 (0.026)	-0.009 (0.059)	-0.021 (0.059)	0.233 (0.326)	0.036 (0.055)
Open Bids	0.027 (0.032)	0.020 (0.072)	0.048 (0.072)	-0.500 (0.399)	0.128* (0.068)
Min # Bids	0.017 (0.032)	-0.017 (0.072)	-0.002 (0.072)	-0.406 (0.400)	0.081 (0.068)
<i>P-Value</i>					
Open = Min	0.747	0.609	0.492	0.816	0.485
Open = Ctl	0.671	0.850	0.648	0.417	0.003
Min = Ctl	0.414	0.662	0.700	0.598	0.036
Control Mean	0.071	0.449	0.519	12.139	0.313

Note: Note: This tables replicates Table 2B, but disaggregates the bidding effect by whether the village was randomized into the minimum number of bids requirement or whether it was left open. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 4A: Who Distributes Raskin Six Months After Intervention, by Women Quota Subtreatment

	In charge of any responsibilities before May 2013 (1)	Distributor/ spouse is/was village official (2)	Distributor/ spouse is related to village official (3)	Distributor/ spouse is/was or is related to subvillage official (4)	Is a trader (5)	Lives in village (6)
<i>Info or Bidding</i>						
No Women Quota	-0.040 (0.064)	-0.132** (0.066)	0.110* (0.059)	0.102 (0.073)	-0.018 (0.035)	-0.033 (0.056)
Women Quota	-0.030 (0.064)	0.015 (0.066)	-0.025 (0.059)	-0.026 (0.073)	0.035 (0.035)	-0.020 (0.056)
<i>Bidding</i>						
No Women Quota	-0.157** (0.072)	0.044 (0.075)	-0.027 (0.067)	-0.015 (0.083)	0.132*** (0.040)	-0.025 (0.064)
Women Quota	-0.173** (0.073)	-0.197*** (0.076)	0.119* (0.067)	0.101 (0.083)	0.010 (0.040)	-0.013 (0.064)
<i>P-Value</i>						
Info or Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.904	0.092	0.081	0.180	0.256	0.862
Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.877	0.024	0.126	0.325	0.032	0.892
Control Mean	0.803	0.347	0.160	0.327	0.034	0.816

Note: This table replicates Table 2A, but disaggregates bidding and information treatments by women quota subtreatment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 4B: Who Distributes Raskin Six Months After Intervention, by Women Quota Subtreatment

	Owns truck and/or boat (1)	Avg Digit Span above median (2)	Raw dice score above median (3)	Years of education (4)	Has personal savings account for business (5)
<i>Info or Bidding</i>					
No Women Quota	-0.067* (0.035)	-0.005 (0.078)	-0.003 (0.078)	0.023 (0.431)	0.026 (0.073)
Women Quota	-0.010 (0.035)	-0.013 (0.078)	-0.040 (0.078)	0.445 (0.433)	0.047 (0.073)
<i>Bidding</i>					
No Women Quota	0.063 (0.040)	0.036 (0.088)	0.007 (0.089)	-0.270 (0.490)	0.125 (0.083)
Women Quota	-0.019 (0.040)	-0.032 (0.088)	0.039 (0.088)	-0.637 (0.491)	0.084 (0.083)
<i>P-Value</i>					
Info or Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.220	0.940	0.718	0.457	0.830
Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.142	0.587	0.803	0.598	0.722
Control Mean	0.071	0.449	0.519	12.139	0.313

Note: This table replicates Table 2B, but disaggregates bidding and information treatments by women quota subtreatment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 4C: Raskin Distribution Process, by Women Quota Subtreatment

	Bought Raskin (1)	Price Markup (2)	Amount purchased (3)	Satisfied with rice quality (4)	Distance to purchase point (meters) (5)	Time to purchase point (minutes) (6)	HH paid for rice in advance (7)	Satisfied with Raskin program (8)
<i>Info or Bidding</i>								
No Women Quota	0.029 (0.03)	48 (34.63)	0.701** (0.32)	0.006 (0.01)	-10.893 (15.13)	0.682* (0.35)	0.002 (0.03)	-0.011 (0.01)
Women Quota	-0.047 (0.03)	-13 (28.64)	-0.403 (0.26)	0.006 (0.01)	9.003 (22.45)	0.193 (0.37)	0.024 (0.03)	-0.029** (0.01)
<i>Bidding</i>								
No Women Quota	-0.027 (0.04)	-75* (38.84)	-0.362 (0.37)	0.024 (0.02)	17.642 (18.24)	-0.838** (0.39)	0.005 (0.04)	-0.007 (0.02)
Women Quota	0.068* (0.04)	-20 (31.39)	0.363 (0.29)	0.014 (0.02)	-2.369 (24.49)	-0.159 (0.40)	-0.023 (0.03)	0.018 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Info or Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.06	0.15	0.00	0.97	0.43	0.31	0.62	0.32
Bidding: No Quota = Quota	0.06	0.28	0.13	0.65	0.52	0.22	0.58	0.25
Number of observations	6,860	5,886	6,858	6,533	6,194	6,247	6,394	6,782
Control Mean	0.76	652.39	5.76	0.51	190.96	5.94	0.43	0.59

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but disaggregates bidding and information treatments by women quota subtreatment. Standard errors are clustered by village.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 5A: Who Distributes Raskin Six Months After Intervention, by Enhanced Supervision Subtreatment

	In charge of any responsibilities before May 2013 (1)	Distributor/ spouse is/was village official (2)	Distributor/ spouse is related to village official (3)	Distributor/ spouse is/was or is related to subvillage official (4)	Is a trader (5)	Lives in village (6)
<i>Info or Bidding</i>						
No Enhanced Supervision	-0.034 (0.064)	-0.120* (0.067)	0.018 (0.059)	0.032 (0.073)	-0.031 (0.035)	-0.057 (0.056)
Enhanced Supervision	-0.035 (0.064)	0.001 (0.066)	0.067 (0.059)	0.045 (0.073)	0.047 (0.035)	0.003 (0.056)
<i>Bidding</i>						
No Enhanced Supervision	-0.164** (0.073)	-0.038 (0.076)	0.073 (0.067)	0.060 (0.083)	0.107*** (0.040)	0.012 (0.064)
Enhanced Supervision	-0.166** (0.072)	-0.115 (0.075)	0.019 (0.067)	0.027 (0.082)	0.035 (0.040)	-0.050 (0.063)
<i>P-Value</i>						
Info or Bidding: No Enhanced = Enhanced	0.987	0.167	0.531	0.885	0.093	0.415
Bidding: No Enhanced = Enhanced	0.985	0.474	0.569	0.776	0.209	0.493
Control Mean	0.803	0.347	0.160	0.327	0.034	0.816

Note: This table replicates Table 2A, but disaggregates bidding and information treatments by enhanced supervision subtreatment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 5B: Who Distributes Raskin Six Months After Intervention, by Enhanced Supervision Subtreatment

	Owns truck and/or boat (1)	Avg Digit Span above median (2)	Raw dice score above median (3)	Years of education (4)	Has personal savings account for business (5)
<i>Info or Bidding</i>					
No Enhanced Supervision	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.003 (0.078)	-0.007 (0.078)	0.104 (0.432)	0.064 (0.073)
Enhanced Supervision	-0.025 (0.035)	-0.014 (0.078)	-0.035 (0.078)	0.362 (0.432)	0.008 (0.073)
<i>Bidding</i>					
No Enhanced Supervision	0.040 (0.040)	0.070 (0.088)	0.026 (0.089)	-0.357 (0.492)	0.024 (0.083)
Enhanced Supervision	0.005 (0.039)	-0.064 (0.088)	0.021 (0.088)	-0.549 (0.488)	0.183** (0.082)
<i>P-Value</i>					
Info or Bidding: No Enhanced = Enhanced	0.565	0.913	0.784	0.649	0.556
Bidding: No Enhanced = Enhanced	0.532	0.285	0.974	0.783	0.177
Control Mean	0.071	0.449	0.519	12.139	0.313

Note: This table replicates Table 2B, but disaggregates bidding and information treatments by enhanced supervision subtreatment. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 5C: Raskin Distribution Process, by Enhanced Supervision Subtreatment

	Bought Raskin (1)	Price Markup (2)	Amount purchased (3)	Satisfied with rice quality (4)	Distance to purchase point (meters) (5)	Time to purchase point (minutes) (6)	HH paid for rice in advance (7)	Satisfied with Raskin program (8)
<i>Info or Bidding</i>								
No Enhanced Supervision	0.026 (0.03)	82*** (31.86)	0.269 (0.34)	0.007 (0.01)	6.913 (17.60)	0.899** (0.40)	0.040 (0.03)	-0.008 (0.01)
Enhanced Supervision	-0.044 (0.03)	-45 (29.21)	0.035 (0.26)	0.005 (0.02)	-8.599 (20.45)	-0.015 (0.30)	-0.015 (0.03)	-0.032** (0.01)
<i>Bidding</i>								
No Enhanced Supervision	0.015 (0.03)	-114*** (34.44)	0.113 (0.38)	0.019 (0.02)	25.478 (20.02)	-0.951** (0.43)	-0.048 (0.04)	-0.008 (0.02)
Enhanced Supervision	0.026 (0.04)	16 (33.13)	-0.118 (0.30)	0.019 (0.02)	-10.087 (22.23)	-0.049 (0.35)	0.030 (0.04)	0.020 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Info or Bidding: Not Enhanced = Enhanced	0.08	0.00	0.56	0.90	0.54	0.05	0.20	0.19
Bidding: Not Enhanced = Enhanced	0.84	0.01	0.63	0.99	0.23	0.10	0.13	0.19
Number of observations	6,860	5,886	6,858	6,533	6,194	6,247	6,394	6,782
Control Mean	0.76	652.39	5.76	0.51	190.96	5.94	0.43	0.59

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but disaggregates bidding and information treatments by enhanced supervision subtreatment. Standard errors are clustered by village.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 6A: Randomization Checks for Bidding and Information Treatments

	Means			Difference Between Treatment and Control, with Stratum FE			
	N	Control	Bidding	Information	Bidding vs Control	Information versus Control	Bidding versus Information
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Log per capita consumption	6859	13.06	13.04	13.05	-.02 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)
Years of education of HH Head	6787	6.11	6.16	5.97	.08 (.13)	-.14 (.16)	.22 (.17)
Bought raskin in last 2 months	6860	.72	.73	.77	.01 (.02)	.05* (.02)	-.04 (.03)
Raskin price markup (Rp/kg)	5332	650.85	654.47	683.13	-16.82 (22.79)	20.12 (29.94)	-36.94 (31.09)
Amount of raskin purchased per month (kg)	6860	5.27	5.06	5.45	-.24 (.23)	.12 (.26)	-.36 (.28)
Subsidy received (Rp./month)	6860	28141.77	26948.15	28952.66	-1375.06 (1256.69)	450.69 (1439.08)	-1825.75 (1519.1)
Overall satisfaction according to household, scaled 0-1	6732	0.57	0.57	0.57	0 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
Exclusion error	4621	.2	.2	.16	-.01 (.02)	-.04* (.02)	.03 (.03)
Inclusion error	2239	0.57	.58	.62	.01 (.03)	.06 (.04)	-.04 (.04)
Village Distance to Kecamatan	572	7.52	5.86	7.72	-2.1 (1.36)	.45 (1.91)	-2.55 (1.93)
Percentage of Agriculture Households in RT	572	.07	.07	.06	-.01 (.01)	-.01* (.01)	.01 (.01)
Log village size	572	6.97	6.91	7	-.04 (.05)	.04 (.07)	-.08 (.07)
Village Head Years of Education	572	13.39	13.31	13.61	-.04 (.18)	.23 (.21)	-.27 (.23)
Village government official is part of Raskin distribution committee	572	0.68	.71	.63	.03 (.04)	-.06 (.06)	.08 (.06)
Sub-village government official is part of Raskin distribution committee	572	.78	.8	0.68	.02 (.04)	-.09* (.05)	.12** (.05)
P-value, joint significance					0.23	0.5	0.2

Note: This table provides a check on the randomization across the bidding, information and control groups. The data come from the baseline surveys. Village distance to kecamatan and percentage of agricultural households in RT come from Targeting 2 survey (an previous round of surveys). Columns (2), (3) and (4) provide means for each variable for the control, bidding and information groups, respectively. We provide the difference in means with strata fixed effects in Columns (5) and (6). Joint significance p-value comes from randomization inference with 1000 re-randomization iterations. Standard errors clustered by village in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 6B: Randomization Checks for Minimum Number of Bids Requirement

	N	Means		Difference Between Min # Bids and Open Bidding, with Stratum
		Open Bids	Min # Bids	FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Log per capita consumption	2292	13.05	13.04	-.02 (.02)
Years of education of HH Head	2268	6.13	6.19	.1 (.18)
Bought raskin in last 2 months	2292	.73	.73	.01 (.03)
Raskin price markup (Rp/kg)	1779	674.97	634.35	-31.83 (31.48)
Amount of raskin purchased per month (kg)	2292	5.04	5.08	-.09 (.33)
Subsidy received (Rp./month)	2292	26866.03	27029.42	-621.87 (1779.63)
Overall satisfaction according to household, scaled 0-1	2243	.58	0.57	0 (.01)
Exclusion error	1535	.19	.2	.01 (.03)
Inclusion error	757	0.57	.6	.04 (.05)
Village Distance to Kecamatan	191	6.51	5.21	-1.6 (1.45)
Percentage of Agriculture Households in RT	191	.07	.07	0 (.01)
Log village size	191	6.91	6.91	.02 (.08)
Village Head Years of Education	191	13.45	13.18	-.21 (.28)
Village government official is part of Raskin distribution committee	191	.72	.71	0 (.07)
Sub-village government official is part of Raskin distribution committee	191	.77	0.82	.04 (.06)
P-value, joint significance				0.71

Note: This table provides a check on the randomization across the minimum required bid and open bidding treatments. The data come from the baseline surveys. Village distance to kecamatan and percentage of agricultural households in RT come from Targeting 2 survey (an previous round of surveys). Columns (2) and (3) provide means for each variable, by treatment. We provide the difference in means with strata fixed effects in Column (4). Joint significance p-value comes from randomization inference with 1000 re-randomization iterations. Standard errors clustered by village in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 7: Dice Score on Village Price Markup

	Old Distributor	Current Distributor (Control Villages Only)
	(1)	(2)
Raskin price markup (Rp/kg)	0.073* (0.040)	0.103** (0.048)
N	4,351	2,890

This table explores the relationship between a distributor's revealed dishonestly on a task and the price markup (above the official price, Rp 1600) that they charge for Raskin. The outcome variable is an indicator variable for a dice score that is higher than the median and the independent variable is Raskin price markup (in 1/1000 Rp). In Column 1, the sample includes baseline distributor and price from the baseline household survey. Since the dice task was completed at the endline, we also include experimental controls (they do not affect the results either way). In Column 2, we focus only on the current distributors in the control group. Results estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered by village. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Appendix Table 8: Raskin Distribution Process, Excluding Baseline Controls

	Bought Raskin (1)	Price markup (2)	Amount purchased (3)	Satisfied with rice quality (4)	Distance to purchase point (meters) (5)	Time to purchase point (minutes) (6)	HH paid for rice in advance (7)	Satisfied with Raskin program (8)
<i>Panel A: Main Treatment Effects</i>								
Info or Bidding	0.008 (0.03)	23.090 (29.38)	0.203 (0.27)	0.006 (0.01)	16.143 (20.72)	0.582* (0.30)	-0.001 (0.04)	-0.021* (0.01)
Bidding	0.007 (0.03)	-56.772* (30.43)	-0.159 (0.28)	0.019* (0.01)	-1.946 (21.95)	-0.537* (0.31)	-0.008 (0.04)	0.007 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Bidding = Ctl	0.45	0.13	0.83	0.00	0.35	0.84	0.75	0.08
Number of observations	6,860	5,886	6,858	6,533	6,240	6,267	6,394	6,782
Control Mean	0.76	652.39	5.76	0.51	193.05	5.96	0.43	0.59
<i>Panel B: Disaggregated by Bidding Type Treatment</i>								
Info or Bidding	0.008 (0.03)	23.148 (29.36)	0.203 (0.27)	0.006 (0.01)	16.190 (20.73)	0.582* (0.30)	-0.001 (0.04)	-0.021* (0.01)
Open Bids	-0.001 (0.03)	-24.687 (36.39)	-0.171 (0.33)	0.016 (0.01)	24.185 (26.86)	-0.484 (0.37)	0.019 (0.04)	0.003 (0.01)
Min # Bids	0.015 (0.03)	-87.674*** (32.66)	-0.146 (0.31)	0.022 (0.01)	-27.509 (22.85)	-0.588* (0.35)	-0.035 (0.04)	0.012 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Open = Min	0.62	0.06	0.94	0.66	0.03	0.76	0.21	0.43
Open = Ctl	0.77	0.96	0.91	0.05	0.06	0.74	0.59	0.08
Min = Ctl	0.37	0.01	0.82	0.01	0.49	0.98	0.33	0.31
Number of observations	6,860	5,886	6,858	6,533	6,240	6,267	6,394	6,782
Control Mean	0.76	652.39	5.76	0.51	193.05	5.96	0.43	0.59

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but excludes baseline controls. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 9A: Raskin Distribution Process, Eligible Households Only

	Bought Raskin (1)	Price markup (2)	Amount purchased (3)	Satisfied with rice quality (4)	Distance to purchase point (meters) (5)	Time to purchase point (minutes) (6)	HH paid for rice in advance (7)	Satisfied with Raskin program (8)
<i>Panel A: Main Treatment Effects</i>								
Info or Bidding	-0.005 (0.02)	19.935 (23.27)	0.095 (0.27)	0.010 (0.01)	-11.826 (16.50)	0.382 (0.30)	0.001 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.01)
Bidding	0.012 (0.03)	-52.867** (23.86)	0.080 (0.29)	0.018 (0.01)	17.804 (17.35)	-0.449 (0.31)	-0.001 (0.03)	0.003 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Bidding = Ctl	0.74	0.06	0.42	0.00	0.62	0.76	0.99	0.11
Number of observations	4,621	4,327	4,619	4,565	4,391	4,434	4,549	4,609
Control Mean	0.84	642.03	6.61	0.51	196.22	6.17	0.44	0.60
<i>Panel B: Disaggregated by Bidding Type Treatment</i>								
Info or Bidding	-0.005 (0.02)	20.024 (23.27)	0.096 (0.27)	0.010 (0.01)	-11.701 (16.51)	0.382 (0.30)	0.001 (0.02)	-0.017 (0.01)
Open Bids	0.015 (0.03)	-28.663 (28.54)	0.206 (0.35)	0.018 (0.01)	38.555* (20.94)	-0.399 (0.38)	0.029 (0.03)	0.002 (0.01)
Min # Bids	0.008 (0.03)	-76.828*** (25.76)	-0.047 (0.32)	0.018 (0.01)	-2.750 (18.36)	-0.499 (0.34)	-0.031 (0.03)	0.004 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Open = Min	0.84	0.07	0.46	0.97	0.03	0.77	0.05	0.90
Open = Ctl	0.69	0.71	0.31	0.02	0.10	0.95	0.20	0.20
Min = Ctl	0.90	0.00	0.85	0.02	0.30	0.65	0.23	0.20
Number of observations	4,621	4,327	4,619	4,565	4,391	4,434	4,549	4,609
Control Mean	0.84	642.03	6.61	0.51	196.22	6.17	0.44	0.60

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but includes only households officially eligible for Raskin. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 9B: Raskin Distribution Process, Ineligible Households Only

	Bought Raskin (1)	Price markup (2)	Amount purchased (3)	Satisfied with rice quality (4)	Distance to purchase point (meters) (5)	Time to purchase point (minutes) (6)	HH paid for rice in advance (7)	Satisfied with Raskin program (8)
<i>Panel A: Main Treatment Effects</i>								
Info or Bidding	-0.011 (0.03)	16.707 (36.61)	0.289 (0.27)	-0.002 (0.01)	24.742 (19.05)	0.611* (0.35)	0.043 (0.03)	-0.024 (0.01)
Bidding	0.035 (0.03)	-36.949 (38.57)	-0.190 (0.29)	0.022 (0.02)	-14.818 (19.47)	-0.647* (0.36)	-0.029 (0.03)	0.010 (0.01)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Bidding = Ctl	0.33	0.42	0.62	0.09	0.49	0.89	0.55	0.21
Number of observations	2,239	1,559	2,239	1,968	1,803	1,813	1,845	2,173
Control Mean	0.60	681.37	4.01	0.50	178.02	5.37	0.39	0.56
<i>Panel B: Disaggregated by Bidding Type Treatment</i>								
Info or Bidding	-0.011 (0.03)	16.604 (36.58)	0.289 (0.27)	-0.002 (0.01)	24.756 (19.05)	0.611* (0.35)	0.043 (0.03)	-0.024 (0.01)
Open Bids	0.012 (0.04)	-11.879 (47.15)	-0.482 (0.32)	0.012 (0.02)	-6.228 (22.41)	-0.524 (0.40)	-0.038 (0.04)	-0.004 (0.02)
Min # Bids	0.059 (0.04)	-59.325 (40.00)	0.101 (0.34)	0.031* (0.02)	-22.852 (22.00)	-0.763* (0.41)	-0.021 (0.03)	0.023 (0.02)
<i>P-Value</i>								
Open = Min	0.25	0.24	0.06	0.32	0.44	0.52	0.60	0.07
Open = Ctl	0.97	0.90	0.43	0.51	0.30	0.77	0.88	0.04
Min = Ctl	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.06	0.92	0.64	0.43	0.99
Number of observations	2,239	1,559	2,239	1,968	1,803	1,813	1,845	2,173
Control Mean	0.60	681.37	4.01	0.50	178.02	5.37	0.39	0.56

Note: This table replicates Table 3, but includes only households officially ineligible for Raskin. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix Table 10: Comparison of Winning and Losing Bids in Bidding Treatment Villages, By Min Bids

	Winners		Losers		P-Value
	Mean (1)	Std. Dev. (2)	Mean (3)	Std. Dev. (4)	Losers = Winners (5)
<i>Panel A: Bids in Open Villages (178 bids in 79 villages)</i>					
Price markup (Rp/kg) promised by bidder	479.30	264.45	588.22	309.44	0.00***
Pay Before Receipt	0.48	0.50	0.34	0.48	0.02**
Pay During Receipt	0.43	0.50	0.59	0.50	0.01**
Pay After Receipt	0.14	0.35	0.17	0.38	0.56
Raskin is distributed at village level	0.29	0.46	0.38	0.49	0.14
Raskin is distributed at subvillage level	0.76	0.43	0.64	0.48	0.05**
Raskin is distributed at household level	0.03	0.16	0.03	0.17	0.57
Bidder offers credit	0.16	0.37	0.08	0.27	0.03**
<i>Panel B: Bids in Villages with Min (225 bids in 81 villages)</i>					
Price markup (Rp/kg) promised by bidder	464.04	277.23	551.42	286.22	0.00***
Pay Before Receipt	0.40	0.49	0.38	0.49	0.68
Pay During Receipt	0.36	0.48	0.40	0.49	0.37
Pay After Receipt	0.25	0.43	0.23	0.42	0.60
Raskin is distributed at village level	0.25	0.43	0.27	0.45	0.47
Raskin is distributed at subvillage level	0.77	0.43	0.70	0.46	0.09*
Raskin is distributed at household level	0.04	0.19	0.05	0.22	0.54
Bidder offers credit	0.19	0.39	0.20	0.40	0.77

Note: This table replicates Table 5, but disaggregates results by minimum number of bids subtreatment. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Appendix Table 11: Who was Selected in Bidding Villages (OLS)

	1-by-1 (1)	Joint (Form) (2)	Joint (All) (3)
<i>Panel A: Proposal Characteristics</i>			
Price markup (Rp/kg) promised by bidder	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.001)
Pay Before Receipt	-0.195 (0.203)	-0.240 (0.251)	-0.530 (0.542)
Bidder offers credit	0.210 (0.205)	0.265 (0.166)	0.262 (0.339)
Bidder lives in distribution village	-0.387 (0.264)	-0.277 (0.319)	-0.257 (0.559)
Bidder is Raskin distributor at time of bidding	0.175 (0.115)	0.072 (0.111)	0.117 (0.174)
Bidder is a trader	0.371* (0.188)	0.468*** (0.153)	0.525** (0.239)
Bidder has means of transportation supportive of Raskin distribution	0.373*** (0.115)	0.250** (0.119)	0.261 (0.241)
<i>Panel B: Individual Characteristics</i>			
Distributor/spouse is related to a village official	0.101 (0.197)		-0.023 (0.169)
Distributor/spouse is/was village official	0.200 (0.262)		-0.006 (0.277)
Raw dice score above median	0.088 (0.170)		0.018 (0.140)
Years of education of Distributor	0.040* (0.024)		0.004 (0.025)
Distributor has personal savings account that be used for business	0.365* (0.191)		0.215 (0.202)
Joint P-Value		0.000	0.000

Note: This table replicates Table 6, but estimates the coefficients by OLS rather than the conditional logit. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 12: Corruption and Raskin Price Markup

	Baseline Raskin Markup		Endline Raskin Markup			
	OLS	Strata FE	OLS	Strata FE	OLS	Strata FE
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Village Head's Corruption	495.281*** (129.345)	-116.392 (107.248)	740.377*** (183.251)	283.710* (150.415)		
Raskin Distributor's Corruption					770.953*** (235.283)	521.256** (213.633)
Observations	562	562	283	283	273	273

This table shows the relationship between Raskin price markup and household perception of village official's corruption. Corruption is measured on a 4-point scale from 0-1, with 0 being no chance of corruption and 1 being very high chance of corruption. For columns (1) and (2), corruption measures come from Targeting 2 data, and all villages are included in the sample; for columns (3)-(6), corruption measures come from endline data, and only control villages are included in the sample. All columns estimated through OLS; columns (2), (4), and (6) also include strata fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 13: When Did Original Distributor Win and Continue Distributing? (OLS)

	Where Was No Bidding Meeting Held, or Meeting Had No Bids?				Where Did Original Distributor Win?				Where is Original Distributor Still Distributing?			
	Joint		Joint (Form		Joint		Joint (Form		Joint		Joint (Form	
	1-by-1	Only)	Only)	Joint (All)	1-by-1	Only)	Only)	Joint (All)	1-by-1	Only)	Only)	Joint (All)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A: Reported by Households in Baseline</i>												
Avg Price Markup (Rp/kg)	-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)		-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)		-0.000*** (0.00)	-0.000** (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)
HH Bought Raskin in Last 2 Months	0.042 (0.10)	0.051 (0.10)		0.023 (0.10)	0.353** (0.14)	0.216 (0.15)		0.231 (0.15)	0.053 (0.15)	0.133 (0.17)		0.161 (0.17)
Avg Amount of Raskin Purchased (kg)	0.003 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.01)		-0.001 (0.01)	0.014 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.01)		-0.002 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)	-0.007 (0.01)		-0.008 (0.01)
Avg Satisfaction with Program Quality (0-1 scale)	0.454* (0.26)	0.239 (0.27)		0.258 (0.27)	1.043*** (0.36)	0.822** (0.39)		0.859** (0.39)	-0.002 (0.38)	-0.298 (0.37)		-0.316 (0.39)
Avg Distance to Purchase Point (meters)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000* (0.00)		-0.000* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)
HH purchased Raskin in advance	0.167*** (0.06)	0.109* (0.06)		0.106* (0.06)	0.251*** (0.08)	0.097 (0.09)		0.100 (0.09)	0.106 (0.09)	0.084 (0.10)		0.082 (0.10)
<i>Panel B: From Facilitation Forms</i>												
Old Distributor Provides Credit if Recipient Cannot Afford Raskin	-0.068 (0.05)		-0.063 (0.06)	0.020 (0.06)	-0.090 (0.09)		-0.106 (0.09)	0.012 (0.09)	-0.072 (0.09)		-0.091 (0.09)	-0.051 (0.10)
Costs of Rental Vehicle and/or Fuel to Old Distributor	-0.001 (0.00)		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Non-Transportation Costs to Old Distributor	-0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)
Joint P-Value		0.00	0.46	0.01		0.00	0.55	0.00		0.38	0.52	0.55
Mean		0.13	0.14	0.14		0.59	0.59	0.60		0.57	0.58	0.57

Note: This table replicates Table 7, but estimates the coefficients by OLS rather than the logit.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 14: When Did Original Distributor Win and Continue Distributing? With Baseline Controls

	Where Was No Bidding Meeting Held, or Meeting Had No Bids?				Where Did Original Distributor Win?				Where is Original Distributor Still Distributing?			
	Joint (Household		Joint (Form		Joint (Household		Joint (Form		Joint (Household		Joint (Form	
	1-by-1	Only)	Only)	Joint (All)	1-by-1	Only)	Only)	Joint (All)	1-by-1	Only)	Only)	Joint (All)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
<i>Panel A: Reported by Households in Baseline</i>												
Avg Price Markup (Rp/kg)	-0.003*** (0.00)	-0.003** (0.00)		-0.003** (0.00)	-0.002*** (0.00)	-0.002*** (0.00)		-0.002** (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)
HH Bought Raskin in Last 2 Months	0.234 (1.07)	0.974 (1.49)		0.735 (1.48)	1.427** (0.60)	1.159 (0.76)		1.226 (0.75)	0.113 (0.60)	0.508 (0.69)		0.603 (0.70)
Avg Amount of Raskin Purchased (kg)	0.075 (0.08)	0.001 (0.11)		0.011 (0.12)	0.092 (0.07)	0.030 (0.07)		0.030 (0.07)	-0.023 (0.05)	-0.022 (0.06)		-0.017 (0.06)
Avg Satisfaction with Program Quality (0-1 scale)	5.193** (2.44)	1.777 (3.00)		0.765 (3.02)	4.912*** (1.74)	3.499* (1.97)		3.540* (2.00)	0.186 (1.56)	-1.121 (1.60)		-1.329 (1.66)
Avg Distance to Purchase Point (meters)	0.002 (0.00)	-0.000 (0.00)		-0.000 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.002* (0.00)		-0.002* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)
HH purchased Raskin in advance	1.580*** (0.55)	1.290** (0.62)		1.321** (0.61)	1.085*** (0.38)	0.517 (0.43)		0.530 (0.44)	0.353 (0.36)	0.343 (0.40)		0.341 (0.41)
<i>Panel B: From Facilitation Forms</i>												
Old Distributor Provides Credit if Recipient Cannot Afford Raskin	-0.734 (0.62)		-0.635 (0.67)	-0.297 (0.82)	-0.386 (0.39)		-0.417 (0.40)	-0.031 (0.45)	-0.215 (0.37)		-0.295 (0.38)	-0.211 (0.42)
Costs of Rental Vehicle and/or Fuel to Old Distributor	-0.006 (0.01)		-0.005 (0.01)	-0.010 (0.01)	-0.001 (0.00)		0.001 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)		0.004 (0.00)	0.004 (0.00)
Non-Transportation Costs to Old Distributor	-0.001 (0.00)		0.000 (0.00)	0.002 (0.00)	-0.002 (0.00)		-0.001 (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)		-0.001 (0.00)	-0.001 (0.00)
Joint P-Value		0.00	0.54	0.01		0.00	0.42	0.01		0.76	0.61	0.90
Mean		0.13	0.14	0.14		0.59	0.59	0.60		0.57	0.58	0.57

Note: This table replicates Table 7, but controls for baseline characteristics: log village population, number of hamlets in village, and distance to subdistrict. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1

Appendix Table 15: Who was Selected in Bidding Villages, by the Minimum Number of Bids? (OLS)

	1-by-1 (1)	Joint (Form) (2)	Joint (All) (3)
<i>Panel A: Proposal Characteristics</i>			
Min # Bids * Promised Price Markup	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Min # Bids * Pay Before Receipt	-0.379 (0.534)	-0.823* (0.472)	-1.423** (0.686)
Min # Bids * Bidder Offers Credit	-0.494 (0.358)	-0.281 (0.323)	-0.802 (0.616)
Min # Bids * Bidder lives in village	0.676** (0.277)	1.350*** (0.431)	1.506** (0.740)
Min # Bids * Bidder is distributor at time of bidding	0.260 (0.230)	0.170 (0.234)	-0.049 (0.369)
Min # Bids * Bidder is trader	0.268 (0.417)	0.355 (0.346)	0.508 (0.503)
Min # Bids * Bidder has transportation	0.477** (0.227)	0.328 (0.250)	0.469 (0.465)
<i>Panel B: Individual Characteristics</i>			
Min # Bids * Distributor/spouse is related to a village official	0.325 (0.393)		0.140 (0.369)
Min # Bids * Distributor/spouse is/was village official	0.602 (0.494)		0.455 (0.602)
Min # Bids * Raw dice score above median	-0.109 (0.341)		-0.165 (0.295)
Min # Bids * Years of education of Distributor	0.023 (0.050)		0.038 (0.055)
Min # Bids * Distributor has personal savings account	0.127 (0.381)		-0.010 (0.401)
<i>Joint P-Value</i>		0.008	0.135

Note: This table replicates Table 11, but estimates the coefficients by OLS rather than the conditional logit. Standard errors are clustered by village. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 16: Who Distributes Raskin, After Six Month Re-evaluation

	New distributor at endline		New distributor after re-evaluation	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Info or Bidding	0.041 (0.049)	0.041 (0.049)	0.053 (0.049)	0.053 (0.049)
Bidding	0.160*** (0.052)		0.128** (0.052)	
Open Bids		0.130** (0.059)		0.108* (0.060)
Min # Bids		0.191*** (0.060)		0.148** (0.060)
Control Mean	0.193	0.193	0.193	0.193
Bidding=Ctl	0.000		0.000	
Open=Min		0.309		0.501
Open=Ctl		0.001		0.001
Min=Ctl		0.000		0.000

"New distributor at endline" is a binary variable that equals one if distributor at endline did not hold any pre-pilot distribution duties. "New distributor after re-evaluation" is a binary variable that equals one if distributor after the 6-month evaluation meeting did not hold any pre-pilot distribution duties. For control villages (as well as treatment villages that did not hold evaluation meetings), this is the same as "New distributor at endline." Regressions estimated by OLS with strata fixed effects. Original villages (i.e. if village split in two, only keep original part) only. Each column has 571 observations. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 17A: Why is Winner Not Distributing at Endline in Bidding Villages?

	Number Winners Reporting...
Ever Distributed?	
Never Distributed Raskin	25
Distributed Some, but No Longer Coordinator	13
Reason for No Longer Distributing	
Fell ill/died	1
Couldn't handle responsibility	10
Decided by others	11
If Blocked by Others, Whom?	
Village-level forum	1
Bidding committee	1
Village-level government	8
Kecamatan government	4
Kabupaten/kota government	1

Note: For the sample of winners who report not distributing at endline (38/185 winners selected), this table shows whether they distributed after bidding, and why they claim that they are not currently distributor. Winners could select multiple options.

Appendix Table 17B: Price Gap in Bidding Villages

	Strata FE	No FE
	(1)	(2)
<i>Panel A: Winner no longer distributing (38 villages)</i>		
Winner Cannot Handle	-42.677	-54.740
Distribution	(68.506)	(48.990)
<i>Panel B: All villages with winner (185 villages)</i>		
Winner Cannot Handle	-157.307*	-44.595
Distribution	(83.059)	(60.251)


Note: This table shows relationship between reason for default and the difference between endline and baseline price in bidding villages. Panel A consists of villages where the winner is no longer distributing for any reason, while Panel B is the full sample of bidding villages that chose a winner. Column (1) includes strata fixed effects, while column (2) does not. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 18: Bidding vs Info Meetings (Conditional on Meeting Occuring)

	Info		Bidding		P-Value
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Bidding = Info
Length of Meeting (Hrs)	1.58	0.50	1.74	0.68	0.04**
Total Number of Meeting Attendees	28.54	14.78	21.69	9.13	0.00***
Number Raskin Beneficiaries Attending	12.42	13.96	8.28	8.32	0.00***
Number Village/Hamlet Officials Attending	12.35	5.94	9.42	5.83	0.00***
Any Questions/Comments Left at Meeting?	0.92	0.28	0.88	0.33	0.33
Number of Questions/Comments	6.59	5.10	4.36	2.06	0.00***

Notes: This table provides summary statistics on bidding and information meetings. All data come from the forms that the facilitators used to document these meetings. We present the sample statistics for the 96 villages where information-only meetings were held and then 184 villages where bidding meetings were held. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1.

Appendix Figure 1: Distribution of Baseline Raskin Price Markup




Note: This figure shows the distribution of Raskin price markup (i.e. reported price less Rp 1600, the official price of Raskin) reported by households at baseline. After dropping absurd values (price < Rp 500 or price > Rp 10,000), the top 1% of markup values reported have also been dropped.

Appendix Figure 2: Project Timeline

	2013							2014				
	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb
Treatment Implementation		■	■	■	■							
Re-Evaluation											■	■
Baseline Survey	■	■	■									
Endline Survey										■	■	


Note: This figure provides a timeline of the implementation and survey activities.

Appendix Figure 3: Why were you selected (or not) as winning distributor?



Note: This figure shows the reasons reported by bidders for why they won (Panel A) or lost (Panel B) the bidding process. Respondents could select multiple reasons and/or report their own. Only the top 10 most frequent responses are shown. Data come from the endline distributor survey, which was given to (1) the current distributor, (2) the original distributor, (3) the bidding winner, and (4) one bidding loser (these sets may overlap such that the minimum number of people interviewed per village is two).

Appendix Figure 4: Winning price markup, by baseline price markup



Note: This figure shows a scatterplot of baseline price markup in a village (from baseline household survey) vs price markup promised by the winning bidder (from bidding meeting form). A 45 degree line is provided for reference; promised markup is higher than baseline for points above the line, and lower for points below the line.